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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION: ADDRESSING




M ASS tort litigation in the 1980's has reached unprecedented
levels. Thousands of personal injury lawsuits have been filed
against manufacturers of such mass-marketed products as asbestos,'
formaldehyde, 2 diethylstilbestrol (DES), 3 Agent Orange, 4 automo-
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. The author wishes
to acknowledge Gerald Hobrecht, Teresa Owens and Lori Sarner Smith, students at
the University of California at Davis School of Law, for their valuable research
assistance on all aspects of this article; Lynnda Borelli Pires, for typing and proof-
reading; and my colleagues, Alan Brownstein and Robert W. Hillman, for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. There have been approximately 20,000 personal injury lawsuits filed by
workers in connection with exposure to asbestos. Congress Grapples with Toxic
Torts, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 30, col. 1. Additionally, there are approximately
13,000 administrative claims pending against the federal government and 1,000
lawsuits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. A recent study commis-
sioned by the United States Department of Labor estimates that "there are presently
more than 21 million American workers . . . who, in the past forty years, were
significantly exposed to asbestos." Selikoff, Report to the U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Disability Compensation for Asbestos-associated Disease in The United States 4
(1982). Asbestos has been linked to three diseases that become manifest only after
periods of 10 to 40 years. They are: (1) asbestosis (non-malignant fibrous tissue
growth in the lungs); (2) lung cancer; and (3) mesothelioma (diffuse cancer that
spreads over the surface of either the lungs or the stomach lining). U.S. Att'y Gen.,
Asbestos Liability Report, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-33 (Comm. Print 1981). Mortality
estimates range from 8,200 to 9,700 deaths in workers from asbestos-related cancers
in each of the next 20 years, aggregating over 200,000 deaths by the end of the
century. Selikoff, supra, at 4. These projections do not include deaths from asbesto-
sis. Id.
2. It has been estimated that there are between 400 and 700 pending lawsuits
involving exposure to formaldehyde. Ranii, Punitive Damages Given In Formalde-
hyde Verdict, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 7, col. 1. Formaldehyde foam insulation,
now banned in conventional homes by the United States Product Safety Commission,
is suspected of causing a variety of ailments, including respiratory problems, head-
aches and nausea. Id.
3. In early 1981, there were an estimated 1,000 lawsuits pending against phar-
maceutical manufacturers arising out of problems caused by prenatal exposure to
DES. Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 668, 669 (1981). Diethylstilbestrol is a synthetic estrogen which was
approved in 1947 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the prevention of
miscarriages. Id. Several million women used DES before the FDA reversed itself in
1971 by banning the drug for the treatment of pregnancy problems. Id. The drug has
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biles, 5 tampons6 and intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUD's). 7
Many plaintiffs seek recovery of punitive as well as compensatory
been linked in prenatally exposed female offspring to a previously rare form of cancer
known as clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix. Bichler v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 577, 436 N.E.2d 182, 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (1982).
4. The principal litigation involving Agent Orange is a class action against the
manufacturer, limited to common liability issues, brought on behalf of thousands of
exposed veterans of the war in Vietnam. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Between 1965 and 1970, United States Army
planes sprayed approximately 10.65 million gallons of the defoliant Agent Orange on
the jungles of Vietnam. Agent Orange: A problem of exposure, 117 Sci. News 55, 59
(1980). Dioxin, a poisonous contaminant of Agent Orange, has been tentatively
linked to a wide range of conditions including chloracne, liver damage, muscular
weakness, testicular cancer, numbness, loss of sex drive, wide swings in mood,
headaches, nervous disorders, and birth defects in children. Search for an Orange
Thread, Newsweek, June 16, 1980, at 56.
5. Approximately 700 lawsuits have been filed against Ford Motor Company
arising out of an alleged defect in the transmissions of Ford cars and trucks manufac-
tured between 1966 and 1980. Sylvester, $280M Legal Billfor a 'Better Idea'?, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 18, col. 2. The Center for Auto Safety has predicted that Ford
may eventually spend $280 million paying claims for damages resulting from this
transmission defect. Id.; L.A. Daily J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 5, col. 2. The Center's
Director, Clarence Ditlow, has called this problem "the most devastating auto defect
I have ever seen." Branan, Running in Reverse, Mother Jones, June 1980, at 41, 42.
Nearly 200 lawsuits have been filed arising out of a design defect in Jeeps that
allegedly renders them prone to rolling over. Granelli, Settling for Secrecy?, Nat'l
L.J., May 24, 1982, at 1, col. 1, 27, col. 3.
6. Hundreds of women have filed claims against manufacturers of tampons that
allegedly caused toxic-shock syndrome (TSS). Ranii, Male Files Suit Over Toxic
Shock, Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 47, col. 3. TSS is a bacterial infection that can
result in fever, vomiting, diarrhea, and shock. Center for Disease Control, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Services, Follow-up on Toxic-Shock Syndrome-United
States, 29 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 297, 297 (1980). In some instances,
TSS has resulted in death. Ranii, supra, at 3, col. 2.
7. A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield IUD, reported that a
total of 3,258 lawsuits had been filed against it in connection with the Dalkon Shield;
1,685 of these had been resolved, most by settlement, several by dismissal and only
nine by trial, of which seven resulted in judgments for the defendant and two
resulted in judgments for the plaintiff. Affidavit of R.P. Wolf, Secretary and Assist-
ant General Counsel of A.H. Robins Co., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). As of May, 1981, an
additional 2,309 claims had been brought against Robins, of which 2,003 had been
resolved by settlement or abandonment. Id. Claims continued to be made and
lawsuits to be filed at a high rate after that date. Affidavit of Robert G. Watts,
Executive Vice President of A.H. Robins Co., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Between 1970 and 1974
approximately 2.2 million American women used the Dalkon Shield. 526 F. Supp. at
892-93. It was removed from the market due to numerous reports of untoward side
effects and adverse reactions including infections, pregnancies, uterine perforations,
spontaneous abortions and fetal injuries. Id. at 893.
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damages, alleging gross misconduct by manufacturers.8 Defendants in
such cases face the unnerving prospect of repeated punishment for a
design error, recurrent manufacturing mistake or inadequate warn-
ing. The manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield IUD, for example, has
already been assessed over seven million dollars in punitive damages,9
and thousands of additional claims are still pending in lawsuits
throughout the country.10 One asbestos manufacturer has been held
liable for punitive damages to at least fifteen different plaintiffs."
That manufacturer and two others have sought protection under the
bankruptcy laws as an alternative to defending thousands of pending
claims for compensatory and punitive damages arising out of exposure
to asbestos.' 2
The problem is not limited to manufacturers of asbestos and IUD's.
Other manufacturers have been jolted by substantial punitive dam-
ages verdicts arising out of design errors in mass-marketed products. 13
They, too, face the threat of additional punishment in hundreds of
8. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
9. See Wehrwein, Dalkon Case Nets $1.75M, Nat'l L.J., June 20, 1983, at 4,
col. 2 (reporting two punitive damages awards totaling $7.7 million).
10. See supra note 7.
11. These awards were against Johns-Manville Corporation, the world's largest
manufacturer of asbestos, and totaled over $3 million. See Moran v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) ($500,000 upheld on appeal); Bunch v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (D. Tenn.) ($220,000), discussed in 1982 Asbestos Litig. Rep.
4749; Hansen v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. G-79-124 (S.D. Tex.) ($1,000,000),
discussed in 1982 Asbestos Litig. Rep. 4795; Noecker v. Johns-Manville Corp., No.
366[118] (Pa. C.P.) ($50,000), discussed in 1982 Asbestos Litig. Rep. 4915; Dorell v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. C.A. 7809-88-123-18 (Pa. C.P.) ($1,000,000), discussed
in 1982 Asbestos Litig. Rep. 4910. In Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp.
357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), ten successful claimants were awarded a total of $343,000 in
punitive damages against Johns-Manville and eight were awarded $95,000 against
Celotex, another asbestos manufacturer. See id. at 366 n.4.
12. See Parnell, Asbestos Bankruptcies: Are They the Answer?, The Brief, Feb.
1983, at 5 (manufacturers filing for bankruptcy are Johns-Manville Corp., UNR
Industries, Inc., and Amatex Corp.). The Manville bankruptcy was unusual because
at the time of the filing the corporation was solvent with a net worth of $1.1 billion.
See Granelli, Manville Bankruptcy: The Battle Is Beginning, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 6,
1982, at 5, col. 1. Manville, however, projected its potential liability at $2 billion
based on an estimated 52,000 asbestos-related lawsuits at an average cost of $40,000.
L.A. Daily J., Sept. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Manville's president commented: "This is
not a financial failure .... It is rather a failure of our court and legislative systems to
provide an orderly way to compensate victims of an unexpected occupational health
catastrophe." Granelli, supra, at 5, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981) ($3.5 million punitive damages award arising out of Pinto fuel
system design defect upheld on appeal); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67
Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981) ($1.1 million punitive damages award
arising out of Jeep design defect upheld on appeal); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) ($4 million punitive damages award arising out of
transmission design defect upheld on appeal).
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other lawsuits arising out of the same defects.1 4 Nor is the problem
limited to products liability litigation. Disastrous occurrences other
than product failures have also resulted in multiple punitive damages
claims. Recent examples include the collapse of two skywalks in the
lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri,'-, and the
fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.16
Punitive damages claims on this scale are a recent phenomenon.1 7
Typically, punitive damages claims arose from a single incident in-
volving only two parties, making it possible for a jury to determine an
appropriate award without considering the possibility of additional
awards by other juries. In modern mass tort cases, however, the
responsibility for punishing a defendant is not limited to a single jury.
Such decentralization raises important issues including the extent to
which a defendant may be punished for a single course of tortious
conduct, what the jury should be told about previous awards by other
juries or about other punitive damages claims against the same de-
fendant, and how awards should be distributed among the plain-
tiffs. i8
Predictably, proposals have been made to abolish punitive damages
in mass tort litigation.19 Having withstood years of criticism aimed at
the essence of the doctrine, 20 however, it is unlikely to be abandoned
because a defendant's wrongful conduct injures a large number of
people instead of one or two. Proposals for changing the method of
awarding punitive damages in mass tort litigation are now being
given more serious consideration. These include establishing a ceiling
on punitive damages awards against a defendant for a single course of
14. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
15. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1983). On July 17, 1981, 114 persons were killed and
hundreds were injured by the collapse of the two skywalks. Id. at 1177. Approxi-
mately 140 personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits seeking recovery of both
compensatory and punitive damages were filed against various defendants in federal
and state courts. Id. at 1177 n.5.
16. The fire on November 21, 1980 killed 85 people and resulted in over 500
suits for damages. These lawsuits were consolidated in the United States District
Court for Nevada. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 3. In January 1983, the hotel
reached a tentative settlement of 450 of these suits with the Plaintiff's Legal Commit-
tee requiring the eventual payment of $75 million. Id.
17. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971); see
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967) (discus-
sing the difficulty of awarding punitive damages in a mass tort setting).
18. W. Prosser, supra note 17, at 13 (These questions "might well lead to a re-
examination of the whole basis and policy of awarding punitive damages.").
19. See Szuch & Shelley, Time to Eliminate Punitive Damages?, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 28, 1983, at 13, col. 1 (compensatory damages sufficient to serve deterrence
purpose in mass tort cases); Comment, Punitive Damages, the Common Question
Class Action, and the Concept of Overkill, 13 Pac. L.J. 1273 (1982) (common
question class actions on liability for mass torts serve purposes of punitive damages).
20. See infra note 36.
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conduct2l and eliminating the jury's role in determining the amount of
punitive damages.22
While adoption of these proposals might reduce the danger of
excessive punishment, other procedures could be utilized without such
wholesale changes in the way punitive damages are awarded.2 3 One
alternative is dismissal by the trial court of punitive damages claims
not supported by solid evidence. Another is a bifurcated trial proce-
dure in which the jury would be reconvened to consider evidence
bearing on the proper amount of punishment only if it decided in the
first trial that the defendant's conduct warranted imposition of puni-
tive damages. A third procedure permits closer scrutiny of jury awards
by trial judges and appellate courts. Implementation of these proce-
dures would assure that juries have a continuing voice in the amount
of punishment while providing the safeguards necessary to prevent
unfairness to defendants.
Alternatively, to avoid the difficulties inherent in adjudicating mul-
tiple punitive damages claims on a case-by-case basis, a class action
could be instituted. Two federal district courts recently tried this
approach in litigation surrounding the Skywalk collapse in Kansas
City24 and the Dalkon Shield design defect.2 5 These courts determined
21. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 48 & n.227 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Owen If; Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 Drake L.
Rev. 195, 252 (1978); Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30
Hastings L.J. 1797, 1800-08 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages Overkill].
22. See DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and
Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 Ins. Couns. J. 344, 352-53
(1976); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
Hastings L.J. 639, 663-66 (1980); Owen I, supra note 21, at 52-53. One state has
already enacted legislation incorporating this type of proposal for products liability
cases. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1982) ("If the trier of fact
determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the
amount of such damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages
awarded to the plaintiff."). A similar bill is pending in Congress. See S. 44, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1983).
23. See infra pt. IV(B).
24. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). To compel resolution of all
claims in one proceeding, the district court certified two classes under provisions that
precluded members from opting out. One was a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) class
action on the issue of liability for both compensatory and punitive damages. The
other was a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for and amount of
punitive damages. Id.
25. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526
F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. ,817 (1983). The court certified a mandatory nationwide punitive
damages class to resolve the thousands of punitive damages claims pending against
the manufacturer. Id. The court certified the issues of liability for and amount of
punitive damages pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Id. at 895-96. The court also certified
1983]
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that a class action was the best method by which the hundreds of
punitive damages claims could be adjudicated both fairly and expedi-
tiously. 26 Any other approach might result in the recovery of punitive
damages by only a few of many plaintiffs.2 7
In the face of overwhelming opposition to the class actions by the
plaintiffs, however, both class actions were decertified on appeal.28
The appellate decisions are particularly significant because the ratio-
nales espoused by the courts are capable of wide application. There-
fore, they may inhibit the use of class actions even in circumstances in
which they would provide the most practicable way to adjudicate
multiple punitive damages claims. 29
This Article delineates those circumstances in which punitive dam-
ages class actions should be certified and recommends other adjudica-
tory procedures that may be used when class actions are inappro-
priate. Part I traces the development of the punitive damages doctrine
and reviews its growth in products liability litigation. Part II discusses
the present state of the law regarding multiple punitive damages
claims and examines proposals for legislative and judicial reform. Part
III reviews class action procedures, discusses their applicability in
mass tort litigation and provides a detailed examination of the Dalkon
Shield and Skywalk class actions. Finally, Part IV recommends adju-
dicatory procedures that provide for the equitable distribution of
punitive damages awards and retain the doctrine's deterrent impact
without destroying ongoing business enterprises.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Procedural Framework
The doctrine of punitive damages30 permits a plaintiff in a civil
lawsuit to recover a sum of money in addition to compensatory dam-
ages when the defendant's tortious conduct is determined to have been
a statewide class limited to liability for punitive damages pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),
which permits unwilling plaintiffs to opt out and pursue their claims individually.
Id. at 903.
26. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
27. 93 F.R.D. at 424-25; 526 F. Supp. at 897-98.
28. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
29. See infra pt. III(C).
30. Punitive damages are often referred to as "exemplary damages." In addi-
tion, they have been called "smart money," "punitory," "additional," and "aggra-
vated" damages. See Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 Ohio St. L.J.
5, 5 (1935); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 22, at 639 n.1.
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particularly outrageous. 31 These awards are not really damages at all.
Rather, they are quasi-criminal sanctions imposed to punish defend-
ants and to deter repetition of the offensive conduct by the defendant
and other potential wrongdoers. 32 Unlike criminal fines and penalties,
however, punitive damages are awarded directly to a successful plain-
tiff in a civil lawsuit33 and are assessed without the procedural safe-
guards granted to criminal defendants. 34 These features, together with
the unpredictability of punitive damages awards, 35 have sparked
31. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979); Owen I, supra note 21, at 7-
8.
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) & comment a (1979); Owen I, supra
note 21, at 7-8. Although punishment and deterrence are the primary functions of
punitive damages, several other purposes are also served. First, punitive damages
encourage plaintiffs to press their claims and enforce the law by providing an
incentive for bringing wrongdoers to justice. Second, punitive damages compensate
plaintiffs for actual losses not ordinarily recoverable under law, such as the expense
of bringing a suit. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1278, 1287-99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen II]. Finally,
punitive damages placate plaintiffs' desire for retribution and deter them from
engaging in vengeful, illegal acts against defendants. Belli, Punitive Damages: Their
History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. Rev. 1, 5
(1980).
33. A longstanding criticism of this doctrine has been that its purposes are
inconsistent with those of traditional civil remedies. Justice Forter, sitting on the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1873, wrote:
What is a civil remedy but ... compensation for damage sustained by the
plaintiff?. . .Is not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, excep-
tional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed
among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the
punishment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It
is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law.
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). See Defense Research Inst., Inc., The Case
Against Punitive Damages 9 (1969); W. Prosser, supra note 17, § 2, at 9; Ghiardi,
Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative, 1965
A.B.A. See. Ins. Negl. & Comp. L. Proc. 282; Long, Punitive Damages: An Unset-
tled Doctrine, 25 Drake L. Rev. 870, 888 (1976). The doctrine has also been criti-
cized for permitting successful plaintiffs to receive a windfall. See Walker v. Sheldon,
10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (1961) (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 797
(1965); Hodgin & Veitch, Punitive Damages-Reassessed, 21 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
119, 132 (1972); Long, supra, at 886.
34. K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 2.4, at 33-34 (1980); Note, Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 524 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Exemplary Damages]; Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 408, 412 (1967).
35. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 331, 294 N.W.2d 437, 472
(1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("The implications for the free enterprise system, and
therefore the structure of our economy, are too disturbing to leave a decision of this
magnitude to five jurists."); K. Redden, supra note 34, § 2.4, at 34 ("As the award is
determined by a jury who arrive at a set figure by subjective rather than objective
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
much criticism and debate. 36 The survival of the doctrine in modern
tort litigation despite these recurring attacks is testimony to its four
thousand years of historical precedent. 37
Inherited by American courts from the English common law,38 the
doctrine of punitive damages is generally accepted in all but four
states39 and is specifically provided for in many state40 and federal4'
calculation, the amount of punishment is often not correlated with the amount of
culpability exhibited.").
36. K. Redden, supra note 34, § 2.4, at 33. The earliest recorded debate
regarding the validity of the doctrine of punitive damages was between Greenleaf
and Sedgwick. Compare 2 S. Greenleaf, The Law of Evidence § 253, at 240 n.2 (16th
ed. 1899) (doctrine should be limited) with 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages
§ 354 (9th ed. 1912) (doctrine should be supported). See Walther & Plein, Punitive
Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 369, 379-80 (1965)
(discussing the Greenleaf-Sedgwick debate over punitive damages). The debate con-
tinues today. Compare Ghiardi, supra note 33, at 284 (punitive damages should be
judicially abolished), with Belli, supra note 32, at 23 (punitive damages perhaps
more important in modern times).
37. Multiple damages, punitive in nature, have been documented in the Baby-
lonian Code of Hammurabi of 2000 B.C., G. Driver & J. Miles, The Babylonian
Laws 500 (1952), in Hittite law dating from approximately 1400 B.C., 4 M. Belli,
Modern Trials § 26, at 75 (1959), and in Hindu law of circa 200 B.C., id. at 84.
38. Punitive damages existed in medieval English statutes, 2 F. Pollack & F.
Maitland, The History of the English Law 522 & n. 1 (2d ed. 1959), and at common
law as a means of justifying excessive compensatory damages awards or to provide
damages not otherwise compensable under the common law, J. Ghiardi & J. Kir-
cher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 1.02, at 3-5 (1981). In 1964, the House
of Lords restricted the scope of actual punitive damages awards by limiting such
awards to cases involving oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts of govern-
ment servants, in which the tortfeasor sought to profit from the tort and for which
punitive damages awards are expressly permitted by statute. Rookes v. Barnard,
1964 A.C. 1129, 1226-27. The practical effect of the decision is limited, however,
because English courts still permit "aggravated damages," which are difficult to
distinguish from exemplary damages in that they allow a jury awarding compensa-
tory damages to consider conduct that is malicious, spiteful or injurious to a plain-
tiff's dignity. See J. Fleming, The Law of Torts 584-85 (5th ed. 1977); J. Ghiardi & J.
Kircher, supra, § 1.03, at 7-8.
American law incorporated the doctrine not only to punish and deter, but also to
satisfy the desire for revenge, promote necessary litigation when compensatory dam-
ages are small and provide relief for emotional injuries incapable of measurement.
See Exemplary Damages, supra note 34, at 520-22; Comment, Punitive Damages
Awards in Strict Product Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, The Debate, The De-
fenses, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 771, 772 (1981). By the middle of the 19th century, accept-
ance of the doctrine in the United States was such that the Supreme Court could state
that the propriety of awarding punitive damages "will not admit of argument." Day
v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (dictum).
39. See J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 401. The states that prohibit
punitive damages are: (1) Louisiana, Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980);
J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 409; (2) Massachusetts, Caperci v. Hun-
toon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); J.
Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 410; (3) Nebraska, Prather v. Eisenmann, 200
[Vol. 52
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statutes. In most jurisdisctions, punitive damages may be assessed for
conduct that is malicious, reckless, willful, wanton or in conscious
disregard of the consequences. 42 They are generally unavailable in
breach of contract actions, 43 wrongful death actions44 and actions
against governmental entities. 45
Neb. 1, 11, 261 N.W.2d 766, 772 (1978); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38,
§ 411; and (4) Washington, Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash. App. 512,
521-22, 618 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1980), aff'd, 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981). At
least two of these jurisdictions, however, permit punitive damages if they are explic-
itly provided for by statute. J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 409 (Lousiana);
id. § 410 (Massachusetts).
Most states retain punitive damages as part of their common law, J. Ghiardi and J.
Kircher, supra note 38, table 4-1, but some codify the remedy by statute in appropri-
ate tort cases. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West Supp. 1983); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-21-102 (1973); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5 (1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.010 (1965);
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1955);
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 21-3-2 (1979). See infra note 40.
40. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3340 (West 1970) (exemplary damages may be
awarded for wrongful injuries to animals); Iowa Code Ann. § 639.14 (West 1950)
(punitive damages may be awarded for malicious attachment); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-
5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (treble damages may be awarded for unfair or deceptive
trade practices); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) (exemplary
damages may be awarded for wrongful death of worker); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412
(1978) (treble damages may be awarded for receiving certain stolen property); Va.
Code § 8.01-40 (1977) (punitive damages may be awarded for knowingly making
unauthorized use of another's picture).
41. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (treble damages may be
awarded for injuries resulting from violation of antitrust laws); Fair Credit Report-
ing Act § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (1976) (punitive damages may be awarded for
wilful noncompliance with Fair Credit Reporting Act); Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (1976) (punitive damages may be
awarded for interception of wire or oral communications); Civil Rights Acts of 1968
§ 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976) (punitive damages not in excess of $1,000 may be
awarded for violation of fair housing laws).
42. See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.01, at 5-3 to 5-11 (1981); C.
McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 79, at 280-82 (1935).
43. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355, at 154 (1981) ("Punitive damages
are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the
breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable."); see 5 A. Corbin,
Contracts § 1077, at 437 (1964); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.16, at 48;
K. Redden, supra note 34, § 2.5, at 41. There are exceptions to the general rule
prohibiting punitive damages in contract actions:
[P]unitive damages may be awarded upon proof of the requisite wantonness
of behavior in the following types of cases: fraud; breach of promise of
marriage; breach of contract of service by a public utility or common
carrier; wrongful failure by a bank to honor a depositor's check; breach of
contract of employment; breach of fiduciary duty; interference with con-
tractual relations of others; and breach of contract amounting to or accom-
panied by an independent tort.
Owen II, supra note 32, at 1272; see, e.g., Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110
Cal. App. 3d 740, 757, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 247 (1980) (punitive damages appropriate
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The procedural framework for applying the doctrine is substan-
tially the same in all jurisdictions. 46 First, the trial judge must make a
when breach of contract amounts to fraud); Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556,
580, 350 N.E.2d 635, 650 (1976) ("[P]unitive damages are particularly appropriate in
proper cases involving consumer fraud."); Fletcher v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 80
Mich. App. 439, 444, 264 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1978) (Exemplary damages may be
recovered from one who breaches a contract that concerns "matters of mental
concern and solicitude.") (quoting Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 471, 84
N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957)), aff'd sub nom. Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409
Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141 (1980).
44. Eighteen states currently permit punitive damages for wrongful death while
31 states do not. K. Redden, supra note 34, § 4.2(A)(3), at 87. Jurisdictions that do
not allow recovery of punitive damages rely on a narrow judicial construction of the
state's wrongful death statute. Id. Other courts have construed such statutes to
provide for punitive damages, and many jurisdictions have passed statutes specifi-
cally allowing punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Id. An excellent case in
point is Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 100 Misc. 2d 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1979), rev'd,
73 A.D.2d 1025, 424 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1980), in which a New York trial court held that
denial of punitive damages in wrongful death actions, when they were available in
other personal injury claims, was contrary to the state constitution. Id. at 655, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 601-02. Soon after this decision was reversed by the appellate division,
the New York State Law Revision Commission proposed legislation specifically pro-
viding for punitive damages in wrongful death actions. New York Law Revision
Commission, Memorandum Relating to the Assessment of Punitive Damages in
Wrongful Death Actions or in Personal Injury Actions After the Death of the Victim,
Leg. Doe. No. 65[G] (1982). Subsequently, the state legislature enacted legislation
permitting punitive damages in wrongful death actions. 1982 N.Y. Laws 100 (codi-
fied at N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-3.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)).
See generally McClelland, Survival of Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 8
U.S.F.L. Rev. 585 (1974) (discussion of punitive damages in wrongful death actions);
Note, Punitive Damages and Wrongful Death, 8 Cum. L. Rev. 567, 574-77 (1978)
(discussion and nationwide survey of punitive damages in wrongful death actions).
45. The vast majority of states prohibit an award of punitive damages against a
governmental body or agency, either by statute or by judicial interpretation of
sovereign immunity. J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.13, at 39. The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), similarly
prohibits assessment of punitive damages against the United States. Id. § 2674; see
Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969). Punitive damages are also
precluded by federal statute in suits against foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). A
minority of jurisdictions, however, has held or indicated that a governmental entity
can be liable for punitive damages. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612,
620-22 (Iowa 1978) (punitive damages recoverable against governmental subdivision,
although not against the state); City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 177 Ky. 623, 625,
197 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1927) (punitive damages might be awarded in a proper case
against the city); Ray v. City of Detroit Dep't of St. Rys., 67 Mich. App. 702, 707,
242 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1976) (punitive damages are compensatory, not penal, and
may therefore be assessed against municipal corporation); Lochhaas v. State, 64
A.D.2d 816, 817, 407 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (1978) (punitive damages might be awarded
in appropriate case against the state); Gigler v. City of Klamath Falls, 21 Or. App.
753, 763-64, 537 P.2d 121, 126 (1975) (punitive damages could be awarded in proper
case against the city). In Vermont, damages, including punitive damages, may be
assessed against the state within statutory limits. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5601 (1973).
46. See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.38, at 110, 111 n.1 (proce-
dure with regard to punitive damages liability generally accepted).
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preliminary determination that there is sufficient evidence of aggra-
vated conduct to justify the imposition of punitive damages. 47 Then
the jury 8 has discretion to make an award and to determine an
amount. 49 In assessing the amount, the jury is usually instructed by
the trial judge to consider the purpose of punitive damages, 50 the
culpability of the defendant's conduct, 5' the nature and extent of the
plaintiffs injuries5 2 and the wealth of the defendant. 53 Several states
also require that the punitive damages award bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the compensatory damages award. 54 Although the jury
may choose not to award punitive damages, 55 any award it does make
47. Id.; K. Redden, supra note 34, § 3.4, at 56.
48. As used in this article, the word "jury" includes the court in a bench trial in
its role as finder of fact.
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979); J. Ghiardi & J.
Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.38, at 110-11; W. Prosser, supra note 17, § 2, at 13; K.
Redden, supra note 34, § 3.4(A), at 56. But see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b
(West Supp. 1983).
50. E.g., Central Armature Works, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F.
Supp. 283, 296 (D.D.C. 1980); Loch Ridge Constr. Co. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 320,
280 So. 2d 745, 751 (1973); Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970); see J.
Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.38, at 111.
51. E.g., Loch Ridge Constr. Co. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 320, 280 So. 2d 745,
751 (1973); Ayers v. Christiansen, 222 Kan. 225, 229, 564 P.2d 458, 461 (1977); First
See. Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach, 493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see J.
Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.38, at 111.
52. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, 516 F. Supp. 46, 52-53 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978); Wisner v. S.S. Kresge Co., 465 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. App. 1971); First
See. Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach, 493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
53. J. Chiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.36, at 105; see Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 908(2) & comment e (1979); W. Prosser, supra note 17, § 2, at 14;
K. Redden, supra note 34, § 3.5(C), at 61. The financial condition of a defendant
should be considered because the same monetary punishment may be severe to a
relatively poor defendant but only a slap on the wrist to a rich one. Nevertheless,
discovery and disclosure at trial of evidence concerning a defendant's financial status
have been among the most controversial aspects of punitive damages law. See Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1191 (1931); Exemplary
Damages, supra note 34, at 528. While a fev states have enacted statutes that require
a preliminary finding that punitive damages will probably be awarded before per-
mitting discovery of a defendant's financial status, see Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(c)
(West Supp. 1982); Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (1977), many states have left the issue to
judicial decision, see J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 9.11, at 34-35.
54. See K. Redden, supra note 34, § 3.6(c), at 63-64. As a practical matter, the
reasonable relation rule has not been rigidly followed even by those jurisdictions
which recognize it. See Pinckard v. Dunnavant, 281 Ala. 533, 538, 206 So. 2d 340,
344 (1968); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981); H.J. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo. App. 1, 6-7, 564 P.2d
127, 131 (1977).
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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is subject to review by both the trial judge and the appellate courts.-"
Excessive verdicts may be reduced or may provide grounds for rever-
sal, a new trial or the exercise of remittitur.5 7
B. Application in Products Liability Litigation
Punitive damages have been awarded in products liability actions
for over one hundred years. 58 A recent dramatic increase in both the
number of cases59 and the propensity of plaintiffs' lawyers to seek
punitive awards,60 however, has generated a new wave of criticism.
Some commentators have assailed the doctrinal inconsistency of per-
mitting a punitive damages claim (which must be based on the wrong-
ful conduct of defendant) in an action based upon strict products
liability (which focuses on the product itself). 6 Many courts have
held, however, that the evidence necessary to justify a punitive dam-
ages award need not parallel that required to establish liability for
56. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1, 38-39 (1982); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979); J.
Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.39; K. Redden, supra note 34, § 3.6(A), at
62.
57. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979).
58. The first reported instance of a punitive damages award sustained in a
products liability case is Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852), in
which a pharmacist's error led to the plaintiffs ingestion of traces of poison mixed
with his medicine. The court held that awarding punitive damages should not
depend on the form of action, but on the nature of the harm and the conduct which
caused it. Id. at 180, 13 B. Mon. at 225-26.
59. Products liability suits filed in federal district courts increased by 134 %
between 1974 and 1976. 3 Research Group, Inc., Interagency Task Force on Product
Liab., Product Liability: Final Report of the Legal Study 9 (1977).
60. Ford Motor Company, for example, reported that less than 0.5% of the
products liability complaints filed against it prior to 1970 contained claims for
punitive damages, while 27.1% of all such complaints in 1980 sought punitive
awards. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 54 n.258. If only personal injury lawsuits are
considered, the 1980 percentage is higher. Id. One commentator notes that "whereas
25 years ago, the punitive damage case was a rarity, today it is an anomaly when one
sees a complaint which does not seek punitive damages." Levit, Punitive Damages:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 1980 Ins. L.J. 257, 259 (emphasis in original).
61. Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive
Damages-The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 595, 620
(1974) ("When a plaintiff relies on a strict liability theory, logic compels the conclu-
sion that punitive damages are inappropriate."); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Prod-
ucts Liability, 39 Ins. Couns. J. 300, 301 (1972) ("Strict liability and punitive
damages will not mix. In strict liability the character of the defendant's act is of no
consequence; in the punitive damages claim the character of the act is paramount.");
see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 322, 294 N.W.2d 437, 468 (1980)
(Coffey, J., dissenting); Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability
Cases, 61 Marq. L. Rev. 245, 251 (1977).
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compensatory damages."2 Accordingly, verdicts assessing punitive
damages have been upheld in products liability actions grounded in
strict liability 3 as well as in negligence 6 4 and fraud and deceit.65
A more troublesome criticism is that juries in products liability cases
are ill-equipped to mete out fair and effective punishment to large
corporate defendants.66 The complexity of product design cases, 67 the
difficulty of discerning the "wrongfulness" of a corporate decision-
making process6  and the problem of ascertaining the real wealth of a
62. See, e.g., Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Wis.
1974); Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 179-81, 13 B. Mon. 219, 225-26 (1852);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980).
63. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 775, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (1981) (Pinto fuel tank vulnerable to crash); Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn.) (pajamas catching on fire), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 263, 294
N.W.2d 437, 447 (1980) (rupture of car fuel tank). Punitive damages have also been
permitted in other types of strict liability actions. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123
F. Supp. 36, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (libel), aff'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 846 (1955); Milford v. Tidwell, 276 Ala. 110, 112, 159 So. 2d 621, 623
(1963) (trespass to land and liability for ultra-hazardous activities); Nevada Cement
Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 448-49, 514 P.2d 1180, 1181 (1973) (nuisance).
64. See, e.g., Kappinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Assocs., 513 F.2d 901, 906 (8th
Cir. 1975) (defendants liable based on res ipsa loquitur for injuries and death result-
ing from gas explosion); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d. 109, 132, 253
N.E.2d 636, 647-48 (1969) (Drano manufacturer liable based on res ipsa loquitur for
injuries resulting from explosion of Drano), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Mo. App. 1978) (negli-
gent failure to warn).
65. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral, 523 F.2d 102, 107 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant
misrepresented safety of television), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Campus
Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 97 (D.S.C.
1979) (defendant misrepresented usable life of roofing), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.
1981); Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 600, 176 So. 332, 333 (1937)
(defendant liable for agent's deceitful sale of adulterated motor oil). Punitive dam-
ages have not been permitted, however, in actions for breach of express or implied
warranties because of the longstanding general prohibition against the remedy in
actions based on contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 (1981); A.
Corbin, supra note 43, § 1077. Describing warranty actions in products cases as "a
synthesis of both tort law and the contract law of sales," Professor Owen argues that
punitive damages should not be available in non-commercial actions for product
injuries under any legal theory. Owen II, supra note 32, at 1274.
66. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 20.
67. See id. at 10-11; Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) (courts
are unsuited to implement standards for complex product liability issues); Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From
Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 347 (1980) (same).
68. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 15.
Final "decisions" concerning a complex product are often the result of a
splintered, bureaucratic process involving a complicated combination of
human judgments made by scores of persons at different levels in the
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modern corporation69 are all factors that distinguish products liability
cases from single-incident torts cases. A growing number of commen-
tators" and members of Congress7' and at least one state legislature 2
have taken the position that after a jury decides punitive damages
should be imposed, the trial judge should assess the amount. Sup-
porters of this position argue that the determination of appropriate
punishment in these cases requires expertise and sophisticated insight
into social policy more likely to be possessed by a dispassionate judge
than by a jury. 73 While the jury's role in assessing punitive damages in
products liability litigation has survived so far, there is a trend toward
tighter judicial control over punitive awards. 4
hierarchy who pass on different aspects of the problem at different times.
Various engineers may have to rely upon the work of research chemists,
physicists, and other scientists; input from the financial and marketing arms
of the enterprise must be factored in along the way. The entire process may
take years.
Id.
69. Corporate wealth, as a factor in the amount of punitive damages assessed, is
usually proven by net worth. See, e.g., Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262 So. 2d 258, 264
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 453, 514
P.2d 1180, 1183 (1973); cf. Parrott v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 97 Cal.
App. 2d 14, 25, 217 P.2d 89, 96 (1950) (capital surplus and undivided profits).
Professor Owen suggests that in the case of large corporate defendants, a typical jury
would "be receptive to an argument that anything less than $1 million would be but a
drop in the bucket." Owen I, supra note 21, at 20.
70. See DuBois, supra note 22, at 352-53; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 22, at
663-66; Owen I, supra note 21, at 52; Owen II, supra note 32, at 1320; Note, The
Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158, 1171 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Reappraisal of Punitive Dam-
ages].
71. See supra note 22.
72. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1983).
73. Owen II, supra note 32, at 1320; see Reappraisal of Punitive Damages,
supra note 70, at 1171. This is consistent with the argument that other complex
litigation should be removed from the jury system, an issue which has recently
received a great deal of attention. See, e.g., Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the
Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829 (1980);
Edquist, The Use of Juries in Complex Cases, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 277 (1980); Jorde, The
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial Antitrust Issues, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1981);
Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 898
(1979); Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 Stan.
L. Rev. 99 (1979); Note, Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling the Demands of Due
Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 (1981); Annot., 54
A.L.R. Fed. 733 (1981).
74. See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., 536 F.2d 645, 651 (6th Cir. 1976);
Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 46, 616 S.W.2d 720, 726
(1981); Jones v. Fischer, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 224-27, 166 N.W.2d 175, 183-84 (1969); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment f (1979) ("In many states there has
been a tightening of control by the appellate courts over [the] discretion of the trier of
fact."); Owen I, supra note 21, at 44 ("In practice . . . especially in cases against
institutional defendants, there appears to be a growing trend to subject such awards
to greater judicial scrutiny.").
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C. Mass Tort Punitive Damages Awards-The MER/29 Cases
The emergence of modern mass tort litigation has caused special
problems in assessing and controlling punitive damages awards. A
single design error, inadequate warning or recurrent manufacturing
mistake can permeate an entire product line, resulting in tens, hun-
dreds or thousands of personal injury lawsuits with accompanying
punitive damages claims. 75 Individual awards that appear reasonable
can aggregate to threaten the very survival of a business entity. 76
The first mass tort litigation that presented this problem involved
an anti-cholesterol drug sold under the trade name MER/29. 77 Pro-
moted as a safe way to prevent heart attacks, 7 the drug was used by
75. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. The possibility of multiple
punitive damages claims exists in other types of personal injury suits as well. The
Skywalk collapse and MGM Grand fire are but two recent examples. See supra notes
15-16. Commercial airliner crashes are another. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3,
1974, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 387 (1980).
76. Although insurance coverage might theoretically reduce the danger of fi-
nancial disaster, the issue whether punitive damages may be insured against has not
been resolved uniformly. See K. Redden, supra note 34, at 679. The approximately
36 jurisdictions that have considered the question are nearly evenly split. Annot., 16
A.L.R.4th 14-47 (1982). Compare Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[T]here are especially strong public policy reasons for
not allowing socially irresponsible automobile drivers to escape the element of per-
sonal punishment in punitive damages.") with Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964) (It is not contrary to public
policy to hold that a private contract of insurance protects an insured against puni-
tive damages.). Most of the jurisdictions that prohibit insurance coverage of punitive
damages on public policy grounds provide an exception when the insured is vicari-
ously liable. J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 7.15 (1981). Alternatively, many
of the jurisdictions that allow insurance against punitive damages have refused to
allow coverage when the insured's conduct is intentional. K. Redden, supra note 34,
§ 9.5, at 703; see Long, supra note 33 (discussing both the vicarious liability excep-
tion and the alternative intentional tort exception); Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of
Punitive Damages, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 221 (1979-1980) (same); Note, An Overview of
the Insurability of Punitive Damages Under General Liability Policies, 33 Baylor L.
Rev. 203 (1981) (same); Note, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory,
Reality and Practicality, 9 Cum. L. Rev. 487 (1978) (same); Note, Insurance for
Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 Hastings L.J. 431 (1976) (same); Note, Insur-
ance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 10 Idaho L. Rev. 263 (1974) (same).
77. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). The
drug was developed and tested by the William S. Merrell Company, a Cincinnati-
based subsidiary of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. of New York. See Rheingold, The MERI
29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 116,
117 (1968). MER/29 was approved for prescription sales by the FDA based on test data
submitted by the manufacturers indicating that the drug was relatively nontoxic in
animals and without serious side effects in humans. Id.
78. Paul Rheingold, who conducted most of plaintiffs' discovery in the litiga-
tion, described the promotion as follows:
The initial advertising campaign for doctors included distribution of 100,000
copies of a Western Union manual about MER/29, publication of an eight-
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about 400,000 persons before the manufacturer removed it from the
market in response to reports of injurious side effects 9 Between 1961
and 1967, more than 1500 personal injury lawsuits were filed against
the manufacturer in state and federal courts.80 Many of these actions
included claims for punitive damages based upon allegations of fraud
in connection with test data submitted by the manufacturer to the
Food and Drug Administration. 81
In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., s2 the plaintiff was
awarded $17,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive
damages after a lengthy jury trial.8 3 The Second Circuit affirmed the
compensatory damages award but reversed the punitive damages
award on the ground that the issue of punitive damages should not
have been submitted to the jury.84 Although the court recognized that
page advertisement in leading medical journals, and a series of monthly ads
and direct-mail pieces. In true Madison Avenue form, all this material had
one simple message: MER/29 had been proved safe, nontoxic and free of
side effects. Salesmen on the routes and even a free handout movie repeated
the message.
Rheingold, supra note 77, at 145.
79. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 836 (2d Cir. 1967);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 408
(1967). It has been estimated that over 5,000 people were injured by the drug.
Rheingold, supra note 77, at 121.
80. Rheingold, supra note 77, at 121. In addition, hundreds of claims were
settled without lawsuits being filed. Id.
81. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 & n.9 (2d Cir.
1967). The company apparently concealed reports of side effects in humans from
inquiring physicians as well as the FDA and continued to promote the drug as
entirely safe even after strong evidence that it was not became available. See Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 695-701, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404-08
(1967); Rheingold, supra note 77, at 119. The Second Circuit held, however, that
management's conduct did not amount to "deliberate disregard." 378 F.2d at 844-50.
Prompted by charges that the company had submitted fraudulent test data to the
FDA, the Department of Justice launched an investigation of all test data and reports
of toxicity and side effects known to Richardson-Merrell. Rheingold, supra note 77,
at 120. Indictments were returned by a Washington, D.C. grand jury in December,
1963, formally charging Richardson-Merrell, its subsidiary, William S. Merrell, and
three of the subsidiary's chemists with submitting false test data to the FDA and
withholding other test data and reports which disclosed toxicity and side effects. Id.
at 120-21. After pleading nolo contendere in a prior criminal proceeding, the two
corporate defendants were fined a total of $80,000. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.8 (2d Cir. 1967).
82. 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967). Plaintiff alleged that he suffered skin disorders, hair loss and eventually
developed cataracts from his use of the drug in 1961. 378 F.2d at 836. His case was the
first to be tried of 75 MER/29 cases then pending in the Southern District of New
York. Id. at 834.
83. 378 F.2d at 834.
84. Id. at 835.
[Vol. 52
MASS TORT PUNITIVE DAMAGES
more than one recovery of punitive damages against a tortfeasor is
permissible, 5 it held that the evidence of high-level complicity in the
fraudulent conduct was insufficient to justify such an award. 6 The
appellate opinion has been cited frequently87 for the dicta in which
Judge Friendly warned of the danger of punitive damages "overkill"
in mass tort cases: "The legal difficulties engendered by claims for
punitive damages on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering
.... We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for
punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."' s8
85. Id. at 840-41.
86. Id. at 850. The court noted instances in the record demonstrating falsifica-
tion and fraudulent omissions by chemists, but it did not find sufficient evidence of
recklessness on the part of high level management to hold the corporation account-
able for punitive damages. Purporting to follow New York's complicity rule, which
holds the corporate master liable for punitive damages "only when superior officers
either order, participate in or ratify outrageous misconduct," id. at 842 (quoting
Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 Ohio St. L.J. 216, 221 (1960)),
the court held that the executives were not aware of the danger of MER/29, id. at
850. In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967), however, the court reviewed a punitive damage verdict based on essentially
the same evidence, applied the complicity rule, and concluded that there was "evi-
dence from which the jury could conclude that [Richardson-Merrell] brought its drug
to market, and maintained it on the market, in reckless disregard of the possibility
that it would visit serious injury upon persons using it." Id. at 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
416. The careful scrutiny which was given to the evidence in Roginsky is closer than
Toole to the approach of Professor Owen, who advocates tighter judicial control over
punitive damages awards in products liability cases. Professor Owen would require
clear and convincing evidence of "flagrant indifference to the public safety." Owen
II, supra note 32, at 1368; see Owen I, supra note 21, at 59.
87. E.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir.
1982); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660, 437 N.E.2d 910, 914-15 (1982)
(Sullivan, J., concurring).
88. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
Judge Friendly also expressed alarm at the impact that one mistake could have on an
entire corporation, stating that a "sufficiently egregious error as to one product can
end the business life of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and might
otherwise have continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders
suffering extinction of their investments for a single management sin." Id. at 841.
Having identified the problem, the court considered three alternatives for resolv-
ing it, ultimately rejecting each as unworkable. The first alternative was an instruc-
tion to the jury, like that given by the trial judge, to consider the effect of other
similar lawsuits pending against the defendant throughout the country. Id. at 839.
The court concluded that such an instruction was so vague and uncertain that as a
practical matter it could not be followed. Id. at 839. The court also expressed
concern that local juries might demand that plaintiffs in their district receive awards
comparable to those received by plaintiffs in other communities. Id. at 840. The
second alternative was to place an arbitrary ceiling on punitive awards in mass tort
cases. This, too, was dismissed as impracticable because there was no assurance that
other states would follow suit. Id. at 840. Finally, the court mentioned the benefits of
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Ultimately, no punitive damages overkill occurred in the MER/29
litigation; between 1962 and 1967 over ninety-five percent of the
claims were settled. s9 In the eleven cases in which jury verdicts were
returned there were four defense verdicts, four plaintiffs' verdicts for
compensatory damages only, and three plaintiffs' verdicts that in-
cluded punitive damages.90 Of the three punitive damage awards, the
award in Roginsky was reversed9' and the other two were significantly
reduced.92 The fact that a manufacturer apparently guilty of criminal
misconduct dodged the punitive damages bullet in all but two of over
1500 cases has led to speculation that the overkill threat is "more
theoretical than real."9 3
The recent unprecedented number of multiple punitive damages
verdicts in mass tort cases has raised again the spectre of overkill
recognized by Judge Friendly in Roginsky.94 Because of the threat to
consolidating all pending cases in a single court and allowing a jury to make one
award which would then be held for distribution to all successful plaintiffs. This
solution was also rejected, however, because of the inability of a federal court or any
state court to consolidate all of the cases filed in different states. Id. at 839-40 n.ll.
Much earlier, Richardson-Merrell had proposed that the Coordinating Committee
for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts (predecessor to today's
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation) assume control over all pretrial phases of
the MER/29 litigation. Rheingold, supra note 77, at 126. The request was denied,
presumably because the majority of the cases had been filed in state courts, and the
federal courts therefore had no power to order consolidation. Id. at 126.
89. Rheingold, supra note 77, at 137. All settlements were designated as pay-
ments for compensatory damages only, id. at 138-39, although some undoubtedly
included payments beyond what would have been included in the absence of punitive
damages claims.
90. Id. at 133, 136.
91. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 851 (2d Cir. 1967).
92. Toole v.Richardson-MerreU, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 717, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 418 (1967) (trial judge reduced punitive damages from $500,000 to $250,000);
Ostopowitz v. Wm. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (trial judge
reduced punitive damages from $850,000 to $100,000), reported in N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11,
1967, at 21, col. 3.
93. Owen II, supra note 32, at 1324-25. Professor Owen observed:
[I]f this is an example of the most crushing punishment that will befall a
manufacturer guilty of flagrant marketing misbehavior-and it is difficult
to imagine a more extreme case of such misbehavior than that of Richard-
son-Merrell in marketing MER/29-then the threat of bankrupting a manu-
facturer with punitive damages awards in mass disaster litigation appears to
be more theoretical than real.
Id. A federal district court reached the same conclusion in 1979 in a commercial
products liability case involving two sizeable punitive damages verdicts against a
supplier of roofing materials: "Twelve years have now passed, and many of the fears
expressed by Judge Friendly have simply not been realized .... This court is
unconvinced that the 'specter of overkill' is anything more than just that-an unreal-
ized phantom or mental image." Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn
Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 109 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981).
94. See supra notes 9, 11, 13 and accompanying text.
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the continued economic viability of some defendants posed by these
multiple punitive damages awards, 95 several proposals have been set
forth to modify the structure and procedure for awarding punitive
damages in mass tort litigation.
II. MULTIPLE PUNITIvE DAMAGES CLAIMS: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The courts that have considered the legality of multiple awards
have generally acknowledged that a single punitive damages award
against a defendant does not necessarily preclude additional awards
based on the same outrageous conduct. 6 The aggregate amount of
multiple awards, however, can reach a level so fundamentally unfair
and destructive that any additional awards above that level should not
be permitted.9 7 At some point, justifiable punishment ends and over-
kill begins. Several proposals have been introduced to reform existing
procedures to prevent such overkill, including an aggregate cap on
awards,98 an add-on system for distributing awards,99 a limitation of
punishment in each case to the wrong inflicted upon each plaintiff,100
admission into evidence of other awards,' 0 ' removal of the assessment
function from the jury,10 2 and litigation of all punitive damages claims
in a single proceeding. 103
A. Aggregate Cap Proposals
Professor David Owen has proposed that mass tort plaintiffs be
permitted to recover punitive damages up to an aggregate amount,
the lesser of either five million dollars or five percent of a defendant's
95. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967); Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1980); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348,
1351 (D. Hawaii 1975); Delos v. Farmer Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 667, 155
Cal. Rptr. 843, 859 (1979); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 346, 355, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981); State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d
1268, 1274 (Or. 1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 291-92, 294
N.W.2d 437, 454 (1980); see also Morris, supra note 53, at 1194-95 & n.39; Owen II,
supra note 32, at 1325; Punitive Damages Overkill, supra note 21, at 1805.
97. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 297-98,
294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 6.09, at 31.
98. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
103. See infra pt. III.
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net worth, after which punitive awards would be limited to an
amount equal to attorney fees and other litigation costs.'0 4 While this
approach is more flexible than a strict dollar limit,'05 it has disadvan-
tages. First, five million dollars may not be enough to deter large
corporations from profitable misconduct.'06 Indeed, the five million
dollar limit benefits only those corporations that need protection the
least because a company's net worth must exceed $100 million for the
five million dollar limit to be less than five percent of its net worth. If
there must be some arbitrary limit, it should be the same percentage
of net worth for a large corporation as for a smaller business enter-
prise.
Second, the aggregate cap would reward those plaintiffs fortunate
enough to get to trial early, undoubtedly encouraging a flood of early
trial requests. It has been argued that the diligence of these earlybird
plaintiffs should be rewarded because of the greater expenditures
required to prove the initial punitive damages claims, which often
benefit later plaintiffs by making it easier to establish subsequent
claims.'0 7 It seems unfair, however, to permit a handful of plaintiffs
and their attorneys to obtain substantial recoveries merely because
they are in a position to finance the litigation, leaving subsequent
plaintiffs with little or nothing. Moreover, when attorneys represent
more than one plaintiff, as they often do in mass tort litigation, they
may face the ethical dilemma of selecting which client's case to litigate
first, possibly precluding their other clients from sharing in punitive
damages awards.'0 8
Finally, there is the problem of implementing the aggregate cap
system. Federal legislation is one possibility,'09 but such proposals
104. Owen I, supra note 21, at 49 n.227. A similar approach was proposed in
Riley, supra note 21, at 252.
105. In Roginsky, Judge Friendly discussed setting a limit of $5,000-$10,000 in
each individual case. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d
Cir. 1967). One obvious problem with this approach is that it leaves open the
possibility of an aggregate award that could destroy a smaller enterprise. Moreover,
dollar limits are inherently inflexible and may often be unfair.
106. Juries may find this argument particularly persuasive. See Owen I, supra
note 21, at 51 n.243. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), for example, the jury awarded $125 million in punitive
damages based largely on plaintiffs' evidence that Ford had saved $100 million by
not adopting a safer design for the Pinto fuel system. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1,
col. 4. The Wall Street Journal reported that the jury foreman "recalls bringing up
the $125 million figure himself. He reasoned that if Ford had saved $100 million by
not installing safe tanks, an award matching that wouldn't really be punitive. So he
added $25 million." Id. at 17, col. 1. The trial judge reduced the award to $3.5
million. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
107. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 22, at 669; Owen II, supra note 32, at
1325; Punitive Damages Overkill, supra note 21, at 1811-12 (1979).
108. See infra note 183.
109. Owen I, supra note 21, at 49 n.227; Riley, supra note 21, at 252.
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have not fared well in Congress." 0 Legislative or judicial action on a
state-by-state basis would solve the problem only if all states adopted a
uniform cap system.
B. Add-on Awards
Another proposal would permit recovery only of the amount by
which a punitive damages award exceeds the largest previous award
against the defendant arising out of the same mass tort."' The first
award sets the figure that subsequent awards must exceed for future
plaintiffs to recover any punitive damages. All awards would also
have to withstand the usual judicial scrutiny for fairness.1 2
This proposal improves only slightly upon present procedures for
awarding punitive damages. Although the defendant would be pro-
tected from duplicative punitive damages assessments, the earliest
plaintiffs would have even more of an advantage than under Professor
Owen's proposal. This would result inevitably in a competitive race to
trial.11 3 Additionally, because enforcement in fewer than all states
would destroy its effectiveness, implementation of this proposal, like
other uniform solutions, would require federal legislation." 4
C. Assessment of Award Vis-A-Vis One Plaintiff
A third approach to the problem of overkill is to limit the punish-
ment in each case to the wrong inflicted on the particular plaintiff. In
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc. ,"5 for example, the court issued pre-
trial rulings which excluded evidence of other persons similarly in-
jured by the drug "Aralen," and also excluded evidence of the defend-
110. H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) was substantially identical to Profes-
sor Owen's aggregate cap proposal. Compare id. § 11(d)-(e) (punitive damages
limited to $1 million for each claimant; if aggregate sum of previous awards equal to
lesser of $5 million or five percent of net worth, punitive damages limited to lesser of
litigation expenses or $1 million) with Owen I, supra note 21, at 48 & n.227 (punitive
damages limited to $1 million for each claimant; if aggregate sum of previous awards
equal to lesser of $5 million or five percent of net worth, punitive damages limited to
litigation expenses). This bill, introduced by Rep. Norman D. Shumway (R. Cal.),
was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 127 Cong. Rec. H 9529
(daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981), but was not reported out for consideration by the House of
Representatives during the 97th Congress.
111. Punitive Damages Overkill, supra note 21, at 1801.
112. Id.
113. Only the first plaintiff to secure a judicially-approved award would be
assured of recovery. Smaller future awards, even if justified, would result in no
recovery.
114. The author of the "add-on" proposal suggests that enactment could be made
under the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. Const., art. I, §
8, cl. 3. See Punitive Damages Overkill, supra note 21, at 1801.
115. 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
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ant's net worth.11 6 In addition, the court barred the plaintiff from
arguing that the jury should render an award that punishes the de-
fendant for its conduct toward all injured plaintiffs.11 7 The court
stated that these rulings were mandated by Pennsylvania law which
requires that any punitive damages award must bear a reasonable
relationship to the compensatory damages award.""
This approach, however laudable in its objectives, prevents the
jury's consideration of some of the essential criteria upon which puni-
tive damages awards should be based. The moral turpitude of conduct
should be judged, at least in part, by the extent of the harm that it
causes." 9 A jury could not properly award a plaintiff's proportionate
share of these punitive damages without first determining the aggre-
gate award to all injured persons. To make this determination, the
very evidence excluded by the court in Hoffman would have to be
introduced. Moreover, refusing to admit evidence of a defendant's net
worth precludes a jury from considering a key factor in determining
when even an individual award would exceed the amount necessary to
punish and deter. If every court adjudicating these multiple claims
adopted this practice, the result might be a classic case of overkill.
D. Evidence of Other Punitive Damages Claims
Another way to prevent punitive damages overkill is to inform each
jury of other punitive damages awards already imposed or that may
be imposed in the future upon a mass tort defendant. This is the
position taken by the Restatement, 20 several courts, 12 1 at least two
116. Id. at 857.
117. Id. In rejecting plaintiff's argument that the jury should consider the impact
of Aralen on the whole of society, the court stated:
Applying the plaintiff's rationale, each injured consumer of Aralen, using
identical evidence regarding testing, notice, etc., could individually recover
on behalf of "society" to punish the affront. Such a result would be ludi-
crous. Instead, we view the law to be that each Aralen consumer showing a
bona fide injury may, if the evidence warrants, collect his reasonable pro-
portion of the punitive damages the defendant owes to "society."
id.
118. Id. Professor Owen agrees with the court's view that the punitive damages
verdict must be a reasonable sum in relation to the defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the
plaintiff: "This view probably is correct in that it relates the punitive award to the
plaintiff's injury consistent with traditional doctrine, reduces substantially the incen-
tive to race to the courthouse, and anticipates a multiplicity of similar actions that
together will result in many smaller 'stings' to the manufacturer." Owen I, s'upra note
21, at 51 n.243.
119. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment e (1979).
120. Id.
121. Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355, 629
P.2d 196, 206 (1981); State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Or. 1980);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 304, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-60 (1980).
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state legislatures2 2 and several commentators. 2 3 By considering other
punishment for the same conduct, 2 4 along with evidence of the de-
fendant's current financial status, a jury should be able to make a
more informed judgment of the amount necessary for punishment and
deterrence. 125
Conversely, this same evidence could backfire against a defendant.
A jury may be influenced unfairly by prior verdicts against the de-
fendant; it may believe that previous awards of punitive damages
justify a similar award in the case before it 126 and may even rely on
Contra Lemer v. Boise Cascade, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-11, 165 Cal. Rptr. 555,
560-61 (1980). In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir.
1967), Judge Friendly commended the trial court for instructing the jury to consider
the effect of other cases and potential cases against the defendant, but expressed
uncertainty about the effect of such an instruction: "[I]t is hard to see what even the
most intelligent jury would do with this, being inherently unable to know what
punitive damages, if any, other juries in other states may award other plaintiffs in
actions yet untried." Id. The court noted that the trial judge in Ostopowitz v. Wm.
S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), reported in N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at
21, col. 3, refused to admit the same evidence. Id.
122. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.925
(1979).
123. See Morris, supra note 53, at 1195; Owen II, supra note 32, at 1319; Riley,
supra note 21, at 213.
124. There is a split of authority regarding the admissibility of criminal sanctions
arising out of the same conduct. Compare Browand v. Scott Lumber Co., 125 Cal.
App. 2d 68, 74-75, 269 P.2d 891, 896 (1954) (assault and battery conviction properly
considered in civil action based on the altercation) and Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8,
16, 70 A. 906, 909 (1908) (conviction admissible in aggravated assault and battery suit
arising out of the same incident) with Irby v. Wilde, 155 Ala. 388, 391, 46 So. 454,
454 (1908) (not proper to introduce assault conviction in mitigation of punitive
damages in civil trial) and C. McCormick, supra note 42, at § 82 (generally not
proper to introduce evidence of criminal punishment in mitigation of punitive dam-
ages). See generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 870 (1980) (criminal liability barring or
mitigating recovery of punitive damages).
125. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 304-05, 294 N.W.2d 437,
459-60 (1980). There is, however, no unanimity on this point. Some contend that the
difficulties of keeping abreast of every case and of predicting the outcome of future
cases, including claims not yet filed, make this proposal impracticable to administer.
See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 325, 294 N.W.2d 437, 469 (1980)
(Coffey, J., dissenting) ("Are the Wisconsin courts to monitor the courts of the other
49 states so as to insure that a Wisconsin court's award of punitive damages does not
place an undue burden on the manufacturer and his employees?"); Punitive Damages
Overkill, supra note 21, at 1806 (jury would be forced to predict outcome of subse-
quent actions as well as consider those being adjudicated or already adjudicated).
126. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967);
Punitive Damages Overkill, supra note 21, at 1806-07. Professor Morris recom-
mended that the jury be apprised of such evidence, but cautioned:
This would not be without its dangers, for juries might assume that since the
defendant has once been found guilty, their verdict must necessarily be
against him. They might also fail to see that the defendant has already been
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such awards in determining the defendant's compensatory damages
liability. 127 Such knowledge on the part of the jury might therefore be
highly prejudicial to defendants, 12  who would probably prefer to
take their chances with juries that are uninformed about other litiga-
tion arising out of the same conduct.
E. Removal of the Assessment Function from the Jury
Many of the problems generated by multiple punitive damages
claims might be avoided by authorizing the trial judge, rather than
the jury, to determine the amount of punitive damages. 2 9 Under this
approach, the jury would still decide whether punitive damages
should be assessed without being apprised of either the findings of
other juries or the defendant's net worth. If the jury determined that
punitive damages should be awarded, the court would assess an ap-
propriate award based on all the usual considerations, including evi-
dence of other punitive damages claims and awards and evidence of
the defendant's financial condition. 130 This approach is consistent
with the view that judges will award punitive damages based on a
more sophisticated understanding of the proper punishment for corpo-
rate defendants' misconduct.13 1 It eliminates, however, the important
function of the jury as the conscience of the community in assessing an
punished in part, and might feel it their duty to punish him more severely
because of the injury to others than the plaintiff. In other words, this
evidence which is given to the jury on the theory that the defendant should
have a comparatively lenient admonition, if any, might prejudice them in
such a way that the defendant would be held liable regardless of a failure of
the plaintiff to prove his case, and be given more severe admonition than he
would receive without its admission.
Morris, supra note 53, at 1195 n.40.
127. This seems particularly true in a close case when the question of a product's
defectiveness is seriously disputed. Plaintiffs' attorneys might welcome this evidence
to tip the scales on a complicated issue of liability. The fact that other juries have
found the defendant's conduct in marketing the product outrageous in addition to
finding the product defective might be an important consideration in the jury room.
See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.40, at 125-26; Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 22, at 665.
128. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Proce-
dure, 69 Va. L. Rev. 269, 295 (1983). Evidence of other punitive damages claims
might otherwise be inadmissible. Id. The prejudicial character of prior judgments
against the defendant may be exacerbated by the fact that different standards of
proof obtained in the previous trial. J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.42, at
129.
129. See supra notes 22, 71 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
131. See supra note 66.
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amount of punitive damages that reflects the degree of the defendant's
culpability. 132
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND CLASS AcriONS
The problematic alterations in the mechanism for assessing punitive
damages outlined above are not necessary to prevent punitive dam-
ages overkill. In appropriate circumstances, a class action may pro-
vide the best means of resolving the problems presented by punitive
damages in mass tort litigation.
The idea of litigating all punitive damages claims in a single pro-
ceeding is not new. In a superb article published over fifty years ago,
Professor Morris proposed that when there are multiple claims any
assessment of punitive damages should be withheld until all compen-
satory damages claims are resolved. 133 Joinder of the punitive damages
claims would then be appropriate. 3 4 In the Roginsky opinion dis-
cussed above, Judge Friendly envisioned a procedure by which "it
might be possible for a jury to make one award to be held for appro-
priate distribution among all successful plaintiffs."' 3
5
While these approaches provide a theoretical basis for the resolution
of many of the punitive damages problems, only class actions provide
a practical means for doing so. The other procedural devices for
consolidating multiple lawsuits'36 generally do not provide for a single
trial on the punitive damages issue because they cannot affect actions
132. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
133. Morris, supra note 53, at 1195.
134. Id. Professor Morris, however, was discussing a situation like that presented
by the twin cases of Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 231, 147 N.W. 17 (1914), and Luther
v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914). In those cases, a man who failed to
fulfill a promise of marriage was held liable for punitive damages both to the jilted
woman for breach of promise, 157 Wis. at 233, 147 N.W. at 17, and to her father for
"seduction" of his daughter, 157 Wis. at 235, 147 N.W. at 18. Professor Morris
specifically limited his proposal to these and similar facts: "Such practice might not
be advisable when it would result in the presentation to a court of evidence of a
highly disparate mass of losses only tied together by the common factor of being
caused by a single act." Morris, supra note 53, at 1195.
135. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 n.1l (2d Cir.
1967). The court ultimately rejected this procedure because it considered federal
legislation the only practicable means of implementation: "[W]e perceive no way of
accomplishing that except by legislation requiring all claims in respect of drugs
supervised by the FDA to be asserted in the federal courts-hardly a desirable
course." Id.
136. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (joinder); Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 (interpleader);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (intervention); Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (consolidation).
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pending in other jurisdictions.137 For example, a state court in which a
Dalkon Shield claim is pending could not consolidate cases pending in
federal courts or in the courts of sister states. Similarly, a federal
district court could not unilaterally consolidate Dalkon Shield cases
pending in state courts or other federal courts. 138
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 139 has the authority to
transfer mass tort cases pending in various federal districts to a single
federal district court, but these transfers are available only for the
purpose of coordinating and economizing the discovery process and
other pre-trial procedures. 140 When discovery and other pre-trial pro-
ceedings have been completed, the actions are generally remanded to
the transferor courts for trial. 141
Federal change of venue provisions provide a mechanism for trans-
fer of cases between federal districts for trial, but only to a district
where the action might originally have been brought. 142 This could
result in a single punitive damages trial only in the unlikely event that
all the cases were filed in federal courts and all the district courts in
which the actions were brought agreed to the transfer.
In view of the problems associated with other procedural devices
for combining multiple lawsuits, it was logical for the federal district
137. See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 12.10 (2d ed. 1977) (federal
process can generally only be served within territorial limits of a state in which a
court is sitting); C. Wright, Federal Courts 420-21 (4th ed. 1983) (same).
138. See C. Wright, supra note 137, at 420-21. See supra note 88.
139. The Judicial Panel consists of seven circuit and district judges designated by
the Chief Justice of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1976).
140. Id. § 1407. The Judicial Panel, upon its own initiative or motion of a party,
may order cases from various districts transferred to a convenient forum for pre-trial
purposes. Id. § 1407(c). This procedure has been invoked in many instances of mass
tort litigation. See, e.g., In re Cutter Labs., Inc. "Braunwald-Cutter" Aortic Heart
Valve Prods. Liab. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 1295 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Multi-Piece
Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Taipei Int'l Airport on July 31, 1975, 433 F. Supp. 1120 (J.P.M.D.L.
1977); In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp.
1394 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973). Cases involving the Dalkon Shield IUD were transferred by
the Judicial Panel in 1975 to the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas for co-ordinated pre-trial proceedings. See In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976). Another limitation on the Judicial Panel is its
inability to consolidate cases pending in both state and federal courts. In addition,
even in the unlikely event that all mass tort law suits were brought in federal courts,
consolidation within a single district could be achieved only with respect to the cases
already pending. Therefore, when claims arise over an extended period of time, as do
many that arise from a single design defect in a mass-produced product, consolida-
tion would not prevent multiple punitive damages awards. See J. Ghiardi & J.
Kircher, supra note 38, § 5.42, at 128.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976); see In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving Air
Crash Disaster near Hanover, N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.N.H.
1971).
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courts in the Skywalk and Dalkon Shield cases to use the class action as
a means of adjudicating the punitive damages claims. By using repre-
sentative parties, a class action can cut across jurisdictional lines and
determine the rights of a large group of similarly interested claimants
in a single proceeding. 43 Overkill would be avoided because the
defendant's entire punitive damages liability would be determined in
a single action. The amount awarded in a single trial could be distrib-
uted among claimants on a basis far more equitable than approaches
that reward only the first few successful plaintiffs.
The particular circumstances in the Skywalk and Dalkon Shield
cases, however, rendered them inappropriate for class certification. 144
Nevertheless, the cases presented the courts of appeals with an oppor-
tunity to offer guidelines on the appropriate use of class actions in
connection with multiple punitive damages claims. The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits instead severely restricted the circumstances in which a
class action would be considered appropriate, thereby effectively dis-
carding a procedural device that under certain conditions provides the
best solution to the mass tort punitive damages problem. 145
A. Federal Class Action Procedures
Tracing its origins to English equity practice, 146 federal class action
procedure was codified in 1938 in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 147 Rule 23 was substantially revised in 1966 because of
general confusion and dissatisfaction with the criteria for determining
which cases were appropriate for class action treatment. 148 The 1966
143. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1751 (1972 & Supp. 1980).
144. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
145. See infra pt. IV(A).
146. For a detailed history of equitable class actions and their eventual application
in damages cases, see Foster, The Status of Class Action Litigation, Research Contri-
butions of the American Bar Foundation (No. 4 1974).
147. The full text of original Rule 23 and advisory committee notes are reprinted
in 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 23.01[1.-1], [2] (2d ed.
1982). Most states have some form of class action statute, several of them similar to
Rule 23. Note, State Class Action Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 60 Iowa L. Rev.
93, 102 (1974); Comment, Federal and State Class Actions: Developments and
Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J. 39, 74-76, 78-82 (1975); see Unif. Class Actions [Act]
[Rule], 12 U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1983) (act similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).
148. Original Rule 23 reflected Professor Moore's terminology and distinction
between "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class suits. It provided in relevant part:
[One or more persons may bring suit on behalf of a class] when the charac-
ter of the right sought to be enforced is
(1) joint, or common ...
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
1983]
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amendments changed the structure of the rule and provided clearer
guidelines for the certification and administration of class actions. 14
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 147, at 1 23.01 [1.4], at 23-14. Criticism
focused on the inability to comprehend the criteria. See Note, Federal Class Actions:
A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 818, 822 (1946) ("The federal
courts have, in general, uncritically accepted Professor Moore's terminology and the
analysis of representative actions in terms of jural relationships and joinder, to their
own confusion and the frustration of the purpose of representative actions.").
149. Rule 23(a), as amended, provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against the members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesireability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; No-
tice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Action.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
[Vol. 52
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The question of certification is addressed to the discretion of the
district court, which must determine whether the provisions of Rule
23 have been met. 150 The four general prerequisites to any class action
have come to be known as "numerosity" of class members, "common-
ality" of legal and factual questions, "typicality" of claims and de-
fenses of the class representative and "adequacy of representation.''
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his coun-
sel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivi-
sion (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members
of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct
of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that
the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to represen-
tation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) deal-
ing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an
order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
150. See Walker v. Jim Dandy Co., 638 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1981); Shapiro
v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 71 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 860 (1981); Rex v. Owens ex rel. State of Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 435-36
(10th Cir. 1978).
151. See A. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and
Future 22-31 (1977). There are two additional general prerequisites which have been
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If these prerequisites are satisfied, the court's focus turns to whether
the circumstances fit within a category of permissible class actions
specified in Rule 23(b). 152
Rule 23(b) (1) categories involve situations in which class actions are
necessary to avoid prejudice that might otherwise result if the lawsuits
were permitted to proceed individually. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) authorizes
class actions to protect the party opposing the class 53 from the appli-
cation of incompatible standards of conduct with respect to different
members of the class.15 4 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) specifically protects mem-
bers of the class when individual litigation of some claims might
substantially impair the ability of others to recover, such as when
there is a limited fund.155 These class actions are "mandatory" in the
sense that once the class is certified, all class members are bound by
the eventual result, whether or not individual members of the class
object to being included, and often, whether or not they are even
aware of the proceedings. 156
Rule 23(b)(3), the "common question" class action, unlike its sub-
section (b)(1) and (b)(2) counterparts, does not require that the class
implied by the courts: that there be an actual identifiable class, 7 C. Wright, A.
Miller & M. Kane, supra note 143, § 1760, and that a class representative be a
member of that class. Id. § 1761.
152. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b)(2), which applies to actions in which the
appropriate remedy is either injunctive or declaratory relief, is not generally perti-
nent to a discussion of mass tort litigation.
153. The term "party opposing the class," although ambiguous, is construed to
mean the party opposing the claims of the class, rather than a party opposing
maintenance of the case as a class action. 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 147,
23.35[1], at 23-266 n.5.
154. See Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971)
(patent infringment action against infringing class).
155. The advisory committee note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
states:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class
will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the interests
of other members who should therefore be represented in the lawsuits. This
is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a
fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. A class action by or against representa-
tive members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups,
followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and propor-
tionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note to 1966 amendment.
156. Although Rule 23 only provides for notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the
modern trend is to require notice in subsection (b)(1) mandatory actions as well. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968); Richmond Black
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Va. 1974);
Bormann v. Long Island Press Publishing Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404
U.S. 1055 (1972).
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comprise "all those who will share in or be directly affected by the
grant or denial of relief."' 57 The nexus between the class members
may be simply that they claim to have been injured by the defendant
in similar ways.'15 Because many litigants may have such a nexus,
Rule 23(b)(3) imposes the additional prerequisites, absent from the
"necessity" class action sections, that common questions of law or fact
"predominate" over individual issues, 159 and that a class action be the
"superior" method of handling the litigation. 6 0
Rule 23(b)(3) not only involves the most substantive change from
the old rule,'6 ' but was also responsible for most of the controversy
following the 1966 amendments. Critics complained that the new
common question class actions precipitated a burdensome increase in
the volume of federal litigation' 62 and resulted in many ethical abuses
by attorneys.' 6 3
157. 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 147, 23.45[1], at 23-316.
158. A. Miller, supra note 151, at 40. Another distinguishing characteristic of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions is that they are not mandatory. Concerned about binding
absent class members, the drafters of the 1966 amendments provided in Rule 23 (c)(2)
that the best practicable notice be given to all Rule 23(b)(3) class members informing
them of their right to opt out of the class if they do not wish to be bound by the result.
159. This goes well beyond the commonality prerequisite in Rule 23(a), which
merely requires the existence of common questions of law or fact. Predominance,
however, does not mean that every issue need be common to all class members. See
Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 11 (N.D. Ill. 1969); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller &
M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
160. The determination of superiority requires a qualitative analysis based on the
factors enumerated in Rule 23(b)(3), including the interest in individual control of
the litigation, the extent and nature of cases already pending, the desirability of
litigating in the particular forum, and the difficulty of managing a class action.
161. The 1938 predecessor of Rule 23(b)(3) was nothing more than a permissive
joinder device by which similarly situated claimants meeting the prerequisites could
opt into the class. See 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 147, 23.45[1], at 23-
314. The 1966 amendments changed the procedure so that all class members receiv-
ing adequate notice are bound unless they opt out. See supra note 149.
162. Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375,
377 (1972); see Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Real-
ity, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664, 670 (1979). Professor
Miller, however, argues that although the shift from an opt in to an opt out proce-
dure made class actions more available in many cases, the large increase in consumer,
antitrust, securities and environmental litigation would have occurred in any event
because of the consumer and environmental movements, new legislation expanding
private rights and remedies, and a growing pool of attorneys looking for new avenues
of litigation. Miller, supra, at 669-76.
163. Miller, supra note 162, at 665-66. "[Critics] also have charged widespread
abuse of the rule by lawyers and litigants on both sides of the 'v.,' including unprofes-
sional practices relating to attorneys' fees, 'sweetheart' settlement deals, dilatory
motion practice, harassing discovery, and misrepresentation to judges." Id.; see
Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.41 (4th ed. 1977);
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By the early 1970's, the controversial nature of common question
class actions began to take its toll. Courts became more prone to deny
class certification, 164 petitions for attorney fees were subjected to
greater scrutinyl65 and defendants were often permitted discovery on
the issue of unprofessional conduct by class counsel in soliciting repre-
sentative parties. 166 Finally, the Supreme Court significantly reduced
the attractiveness of many class actions, particularly those of small-
claim consumers, by holding that each class representative must sat-
isfy the amount in controversy requirement 16 7 and that the plaintiff
must bear the expense of notice to the class in a suit for damages.168
Within the past few years, the class action pendulum appears to
have returned to center. Plaintiffs' attorneys have generally been more
selective in seeking class relief, defendants less intransigent in oppos-
ing class certification, and judges more adept at administering class
litigation, particularly in the use of subclasses and certification limited
to certain issues as provided in Rule 23(c).169
B. Mass Tort Class Actions
From their inception, the amendments to Rule 23 have provoked a
split between leading commentators and the Advisory Committee
concerning the propriety of certifying mass tort cases as class actions.
Professors Moore, Kennedy, 10 Wright, Miller and Kane' 71 view com-
DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experi-
ence (pts. 1 & 2), 1976 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1021, 1273; Franks, Rule 23-Don
Quixote Has a Field Day: Some Ethical Ramifications of Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 46 Chi.[-]Kent L. Rev. 1 (1969); Handler, The Shift From Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Re-
view, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971); Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203 (1976); Simon, supra note 162, at
377.
164. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); La Mar v. H & B
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973); Miller, supra note 162, at 679.
165. See Miller, supra note 162, at 679.
166. Id.
167. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969).
168. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
169. Miller, supra note 162, at 680.
170. 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 147, 23.45[3], at 23-353 n.40 states:
[Clonsidering the wide-spread experience courts are gaining in the use of
separate trials for the class issues of liability and individual issues of dam-
age, a mass accident appears peculiarly appropriate for class treatment.
Indeed, the question of liability to all those injured in a plane or train crash
is more likely to be uniform than that of liability for manipulation of the
price of securities; with the introduction of such large-scale public transpor-
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mon question class actions as the most expeditious means of adjudicat-
ing the common liability issues in many mass tort personal injury
situations, particularly those that arise out of a single disaster. Under
Rule 23(c)(4), certification can be limited to those issues common to
the entire class or common to subclasses. Individual compensatory
damages claims, as well as non-common liability issues, can therefore
be resolved individually outside the scope of the class action.
The Advisory Committee has taken a contrary position, stating:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likeli-
hood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability
and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individ-
uals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multi-
ple lawsuits separately tried.' 72
Most courts have concurred with the Advisory Committee and denied
certification of mass tort personal injury cases brought as class
actions. 7 3 Denials generally have been based on the strong interest of
tation facilities as the "jumbo jets," the ability to determine liability for an
accident in one proceeding will be even more desirable.
171. 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 159, § 1783, at 116-17 states:
The central issue of liability ... may be a difficult one that occasionally
will require lengthy expert testimony, perhaps concerning the physical con-
dition of a vehicle or the state of a technological art in a particular field of
transportation or manufacturing. If the various tort claims were tried indi-
vidually, the evidence would have to be repeated time and time again....
Absent other considerations, it seems wasteful to relitigate the same liability
issue in different actions and before different courts. The argument for class
action treatment is particularly strong in cases arising out of mass disasters
such as an airplane crash in which there is little chance of individual
defenses being presented.
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note to 1966 amendment. In a
subsequent article, the reporter for the committee wrote that the committee's argu-
ment against mass accident class actions was not based on the presence of individual
damage questions, a common situation in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, but was based
on the fact that often "the class [action] procedure is not 'superior' to more common-
place devices." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 393 (1967);
see Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 433, 438-46 (1960) (joinder, interpleader, intervention, consolidation, joint
trials and stays are alternative mechanisms for handling mass accident litigation).
The committee's reasoning is inapplicable to single event disasters such as commer-
cial airline accidents or building collapses. The issues of liability and defenses to
liability would always be common in such cases and a class action would therefore be
the superior form of adjudication.
173. Class actions have been rejected in the following personal injury cases:
(1) Involving the drug DES: Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C.
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individual litigants in controlling their own litigation, the diversity of
issues of proximate causation (particularly in products liability cases),
and the divergence of legal standards in cases arising in different
jurisdictions. 174
A minority of courts has certified mass tort personal injury cases 175
as class actions based on issues concerning liability for compensatory
1979); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979);
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
(2) Involving the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device: In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.) (certification re-
versed on appeal), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co.,
63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196, appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301,
413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978).
(3) Involving asbestos: Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., No. 78-642 (S.D.
Ala. Nov. 21, 1979); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
(4) Mass disaster/single occurence: In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir.) (hotel skywalk collapse; certification reversed on appeal), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 342 (1982); McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975) (air crash; certification reversed on appeal), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 911 (1976); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(air crash); Causy v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(air crash); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (bus accident),
aff'd on other grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946
(1974); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (air crash).
(5) Other: In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (Three
Mile Island incident); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
(prisoner injuries resulting from constitutional violations), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 460 F.2d 126 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); City of
San Jose v. Superior Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974)
(noise pollution from airport); D'Amico v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d
323, 167 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1980) (food contamination on cruise ship); Snyder v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (toxic
wastes).
174. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1982) (divergent legal standards; diverse proximate
cause issues), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65
F.R.D. 566, 570-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (diverse proximate cause issues); Daye v.
Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (interest in individual
control), aff'd on other grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
946 (1974); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 78-79 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(divergent legal standards; interest in individual control); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins
Co., 63 A.D.2d 11, 16-17, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (diverse proximate cause issues),
appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978); see aLso
Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 U. Cal. L. Rev. 1615, 1638 (1972)
("[T]he three potential obstacles to a mass accident class action are the applicability
of differing laws to individual class members, a strong individual interest in control-
ling separate actions, and the lack of a proper court in which to concentrate the
litigation.") [hereinafter cited as Mass Accident Class Actions].
175. Class actions are viewed more favorably when mass tort claims involve only
economic losses, or when personal injuries are part of larger economic loss claims.
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damages. 78 Federal class actions in which Rule 23(b)(3) certifica-
tion 77 has been granted have largely consisted of cases in which the
classes were limited to carefully defined liability issues. 78
Compare Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476 (D. Vt. 1980) (dimin-
ished property value and enjoyment of use caused by discharge of waste products into
Lake Champlain) and Pruit v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(commercial losses caused by discharge of toxic chemical into the James River) and
American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D.
Ill. 1969) (commercial losses to exhibition resulting from convention center fire) and
Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973)
(reversing denial of certification for owners of GM trucks or campers equipped with
defective wheels) and State ex rel. Anaconda Aluminum Co. v. District Ct., 158
Mont. 228, 490 P.2d 351 (1971) (tree damage caused by flouride plant emissions) and
Hurt v. Midrex Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 276 Or. 925, 556 P.2d 1337 (1976)
(denial of class action reversed as to plaintiffs whose automobiles suffered paint
damage from particulates emitted from defendant's plants) with cases cited infra
note 176.
176. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Agent Orange exposure); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382
(D. Mass. 1979) (DES); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (fire at
supper club); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (contaminated provisions served to cruise ship passengers); Hernan-
dez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (same), affd, 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Stewart v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., No. 78-L201 (McClean
Co., Ill. Cir. Ct. 1982) (asbestos-related illness). See infra note 234 for a discussion of
Skynvalk state and federal class actions certified after the court of appeals reversed a
previous federal certification.
177. A few classes have been mistakenly certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), based on
the possibility that individual litigation could result in inconsistent verdicts on the
issue of liability for compensatory damages. E.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. 415, 423-24 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D.
Ky. 1977); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 (S.D. Fla.
1973), afJ'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); see In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630
(C.D. Cal. 1972), vacated sub nom. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist.
Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). Under the
better and majority view, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on liability in actions
for personal injuries does not mean a defendant is faced with incompatible standards
of conduct within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(1)(A). No inconsistent standards result
from the fact that a defendant may win some of the cases and lose others. See In re
Federal Skyavalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187 n.8 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist.
Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton
v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); Causey v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D. Va. 1975); Mass Accident Class Actions,
supra note 174, at 1620.
178. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 83 F.R.D. 382, 386-87 (D. Mass.
1979); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401, 404
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 (S.D. Fla.
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C. The Skywalk and Dalkon Shield Class Actions
Most of the reasons for rejecting class actions in mass tort cases are
absent when certification is limited to claims for punitive damages.
Because plaintiffs have no right to recover punitive damages, 179 they
lack the strong interest that they may have in pursuing their compen-
satory damages claims individually. Moreover, evidence of the aggra-
vated nature of the defendant's conduct will generally not vary from
victim to victim. Thus, the class certifications in the Skywalk and
Dalkon Shield cases represent a significant new approach to solving
the problems presented by punitive damages claims in a mass tort
context.
1. Certification by the District Courts
Although different kinds of mass torts were involved-a single di-
sastrous occurrence in the Skywalk cases and the failure of a mass-
marketed product in the Dalkon Shield cases-the considerations that
led each district court to certify a punitive damages class action 80
were much the same. Each court determined that individual recover-
ies of punitive damages by the first successful plaintiffs would either
reduce or totally eliminate the funds available for recovery of dam-
ages by later plaintiffs,"" and concluded that this constituted a limited
1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975). The extent and severity of injuries are
also significant. Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401,
404 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
179. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("Punitive damages are, to a large degree, a
windfall to a plaintiff ... exacted for the benefit of society .... ), vacated, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); D. Dobbs, Handbook
on the Law of Remedies § 3.9, at 204 ("Punitive damages are not given as of right in
any state . . .")
180. Each district court also certified classes concerning liability for compensatory
damages. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.), vacated,
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Cal.
1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
These certifications were based on considerations different from those that supported
adjudicating all the punitive damage claims in a single proceeding. Compare 93
F.R.D. at 422-24 (compensatory damages) with id. at 424-25 (punitive damages),
and compare 526 F. Supp. at 894-96 (compensatory damages) with id. at 896-900
(punitive damages).
181. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.) ("[M]em-
bers of the class face a very real risk that the winner of the race to the courthouse
might be awarded all of the monies available."), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("It is almost certain that
an award of punitive damages to a plaintiff in one case will alter the potential
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fund which permitted certification of a class of plaintiffs under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) .18 2 The funds available for payment of punitive damages
claims might be limited in one of two ways: (1) the financial resources
of the defendants might simply be inadequate to satisfy all the
claims; 18 3 or (2) if resources were adequate, the law would imply some
limit on the extent to which a defendant can be punished for the same
wrongful conduct. 1 4 In either situation, full punitive damages recov-
recovery of a plaintiff in a later filed suit."), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
182. 93 F.R.D. at 424-25; 526 F. Supp. at 897-98.
183. The Skywalk court stated: "Those persons who have filed lawsuits presently
seek compensatory damage awards in excess of one billion dollars and punitive
damage awards in excess of 500 million dollars." In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. 415, 419 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 342 (1982). The court observed that while the defendants' assets and liability
insurance would be adequate to pay the compensatory damages claims, their ability
to pay punitive damages awards was questionable, particularly if Missouri law
permitted more than one award. Id. at 424. Even if Missouri law were construed to
permit only one award of punitive damages, the court reasoned that a limited fund
would still exist because all but the first successful plaintiff would be precluded from
recovery. Id. at 425. Finally, the court noted the potential conflict of interest faced
by attorneys representing more than one plaintiff if the cases were permitted to
proceed individually. A victory by the plaintiff whose case was ready for trial first
might preclude the attorney's other clients from recovering punitive damages. Id. at
425. The Dalkon Shield court noted:
At the present time, some 1,573 suits involving claims for compensatory
damages well over $500 million and claimed punitive damages in excess of
$2.3 billion, are pending against A.H. Robins. The potential for the con-
structive bankruptcy of A.H. Robins, a company whose net worth is
$280,394,000.00, raises the unconscionable possibility that large numbers of
plaintiffs who are not first in line at the courthouse door will be deprived of
a practical means of redress.
In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (footnote omitted), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
184. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). The Dalkon Shield court reasoned that at some point
overlapping punitive damages awards "violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness'
which lies at the heart of constitutional due process." Id. at 899. In those circum-
stances, the court observed:
If plaintiff No. 1 recovers one million dollars in punitive damages, plaintiff
No. 2 runs a serious risk of being told that the amount awarded in the first
suit represented an implied finding of the maximum amount the defendant
should be punished. Obviously, the greater the number of plaintiffs, the
more serious the risk becomes that the late plaintiff will find her demand for
punitive damages dismissed. At the very least, the trial court may admit
evidence as to the payment of prior awards working to the detriment of a
party seeking additional punishment for the same misconduct.
Id. at 898 (footnotes omitted).
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eries would be distributed only to the first plaintiffs who received
favorable verdicts. Subsequent plaintiffs would recover little or no
punitive damages. Each district court considered this unfair to those
later plaintiffs and determined that equitable distribution to all de-
serving plaintiffs could be attained only through a mandatory class
action in which all plaintiffs were represented, and in which none
could choose to pursue claims individually.18 5
In each case, certification was opposed by an overwhelming major-
ity of plaintiffs.1 6 Several plaintiffs in the Skywalk cases argued that a
class action was unnecessary and counterproductive in view of the
rapid pace at which cases were being settled through the efforts of the
state court. 187 Plaintiffs in the Dalkon Shield class action cited several
185. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated,
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 897-98 (N.D. Cal.
1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
According to the district court in the Dalkon Shield case, the representative parties
would first present their compensatory damages cases and then proceed with the
punitive damages phase of the trial. 526 F. Supp. at 920. If the jury determined that
the defendant was liable to the nationwide class for punitive damages, it would be
instructed to assess an amount which would punish the defendant once for all
potential claimants. Id. The court suggested two alternative pro-rata distribution
schemes-one based on the total number of claimants, and the other based on the
amount of compensatory damages awards. Id. at 920 n.183. Although beyond the
scope of this Article, it is assumed that the proceeds of any classwide punitive
damages recovery would be distributed in some equitable manner along the lines
suggested by the district court.
186. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
187. The state court, in which all but 18 of the approximately 140 Skywalk
lawsuits were filed, 680 F.2d at 1177 n.5, invested considerable time in the settle-
ment process with remarkable success. Prior to the certification order of January 25,
1982, 121 injury and death claims had been settled for a total of more than $18.6
million. This represented 41% of the death claims, 35 % of the minor personal injury
claims and 26% of the injury claims by persons requiring hospitalization. See Peti-
tioners' Reply to Class Counsel's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Mandamus at 13,
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342
(1982). In the order certifying the class, the district court expressly prohibited any
further settlements of punitive damages claims while settlements of compensatory
damages claims were permitted to continue. 93 F.R.D. at 428. The effect of this
order was to halt the fast pace of settlements. Petitioners' Reply to Class Counsel's
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Mandamus at 14, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). Defendants were under-
standably unwilling to settle just the compensatory damages claims while leaving
unresolved the punitive damages claims. Brief of Appellant Jacqueline N. Rau at 36,
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342
(1982). The situation was aggravated when the lead counsel appointed for the class
filed a motion to prohibit any action upon the announced intention of certain
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reasons for opposing the action, including the impropriety of certifica-
tion on the court's own initiative, 88 the lack of personal jurisdiction
defendants to offer to settle with plaintiffs in return for full releases of both compen-
satory and punitive damages claims. Id. at 18. Class counsel were concerned that
additional settlements, should the jury be advised of them, might reduce the ultimate
punitive damage award in the class action trial and result in "unfairness" to class
counsel in connection with the fees to be awarded. Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine at 14 n.7, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415
(W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982),
cited in Brief of Appellant Jacqueline N. Rau at 36, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). The result was that counsel
for the class, apparently in the interest of preserving a large fee, opposed the expedi-
tous payment of claims of the class members it was appointed to represent. Id. at 38.
One of the appellants' briefs put the situation in somewhat earthier terms:
The various cases arising out of the skywalk collapse were proceeding expe-
ditiously and efficiently, under the auspices of plaintiffs' and defendants'
coordinating committees, in the Circuit Court for Jackson County, Mis-
souri, well before the institution of the class action in federal court. That
entire process is now disrupted. The punitive damage "tail" is wagging the
compensatory damage "dog," and lawyers from the East with dollar signs in
their eyes have hold of the leash.
Id. at 43-44.
188. Opening Brief for Appellant at 11-14, In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon
Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983). Although the court officially granted the defendant's motion for certification
of the class, the facts indicated that as a practical matter the court acted sua sponte.
Indeed the district court expressly held that it was proper for it to have done so. In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
894 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983). The Ninth Circuit, in reversing, did not address plaintiffs' argument that
a sua sponte order was inconsistent with the traditionally passive role of the court.
Compare In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983) with Opening Brief of
Appellant at 11-14, In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). See also
Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The grant, sua sponte, of
class action relief when it is neither requested nor specified, is an obvious error."); La
Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1973) (judiciary
has "fundamentally passive" role in class action litigation).
A court apparently may grant class certification sua sponte as part of its responsi-
bility to administer litigation in a fair and efficient manner. Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure neither authorize nor preclude sua sponte class certification,
such orders have been used in analogous contexts. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (transfer
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976)); Cass v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., 287
F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (consolidation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)).
Additionally, it has been held that when an action is brought as a class, a court need
not wait for a motion by the parties before making the determination of certification.
See Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977); Senter v.
General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 521-22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870
(1976).
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over non-California plaintiffs, 89 and the diversity of legal and factual
questions presented by the multistate claims. 90
189. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 14-18, In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). The Ninth Circuit, however, denied class certification on other
grounds and did not address this issue. There was no apparent jurisdictional bar to
class certification in this case. Federal courts have indicated that jurisdiction can be
exercised over both defendant and plaintiff nonresident class members, albeit in
limited fact situations, without meeting the minimum contacts requirements set forth
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), provided due process
is satisfied through notice and adequate representation. In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig.,
79 F.R.D. 283, 291-92 (N.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc.,
72 F.R.D. 98, 99-100 (D.D.C. 1976).
While this approach to jurisdiction may be accepted in federal court, there is less
agreement over whether a state court can exercise jurisdiction over absentee class
members due to territorial limitations on its power. While some state courts have
followed the federal approach by requiring notice and adequate representation, see
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.
2d 879 (1978), others have held that traditional minimum contacts analysis must be
applied. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 315, 411 N.E.2d 1092 (1980),
modified, 87 Ill. 2d 7 (1981), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1983); Spirek v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 Il. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1978); Feldman v.
Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (App. Div. 1976); Klemow v.
Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976). For further
analysis of this issue, see Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and
Certification, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 718 (1979); Note, Consumer Class Actions with a
Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 Hastings L.J. 1411 (1974); Note,
Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction over Class Actions, 56 Tex.
L. Rev. 1033 (1978); Comment, Civil Procedure: In Personam Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions, 17 Washburn L.J. 382 (1978).
190. See Brief of the Oregon Appellants at 15, In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Such differences, however, can generally be handled in a class
action by the use of subclasses, as provided for in Rule 23(c)(4), if there are not so
many subclasses that the jury would be unduly confused.
The plaintiffs also argued that a nationwide punitive damages class action raised
insurmountable choice of law problems because each state in which cases were
pending would apply its own standards for punitive damages. Brief of the Oregon
Appellants at 8-13, In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). California
law, for example, requires that the evidence establish at a minimum that the defend-
ant was reckless. See Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894-95, 598 P.2d 854,
856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (1975); Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West Supp.
1983). Several other jurisdictions sanction punitive damages awards upon a finding
of recklessness or gross negligence. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d
38, 47 (Alaska 1979), modified on other grounds, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981); Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 214-15, 564 P.2d 900, 903-04
(1977); Kang v. Harrington, 59 Hawaii 652, 663, 587 P.2d 285, 293 (1978); Jolley v.
Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708, 496 P.2d 939, 945 (1972); Lindquist v. Ayerst Labs.,
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2. Reversals by the Courts of Appeals
Both certification orders were reviewed in interlocutory appeals. 1' 1
In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit held that certification of
a mandatory class of punitive damages claimants in the Skywalk case
violated the Anti-Injunction Act. 19 2 A unanimous panel of the Ninth
Circuit held that the Dalkon Shield class action failed to satisfy the
general prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 193 and, in any event, did not in-
volve circumstances which would permit certification pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) .194 Although each court ostensibly relied upon differ-
ent grounds, the fundamental rationale for each decision was the
rejection of the lower court's conclusion that plaintiffs' recovery of
Inc., 227 Kan. 308, 316, 607 P.2d 1339, 1347 (1980); Butcher v. Petranek, 181 Mont.
358, 361-62, 593 P.2d 743, 745 (1979); Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 91 N.M. 599,
601, 577 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1978); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Ozment, 434
P.2d 893, 898 (Okla. 1967). The resolution of these choice of law problems in
connection with multistate claims for punitive damages is discussed infra note 226.
191. The district court in the Dalkon Shield case requested interlocutory review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 919 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). In the Skywalk case, the
Eighth Circuit agreed to hear the plaintiffs' appeal on the ground that the order was
an injunction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976), which provides in
pertinent part: "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1)
Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... granting, continu-
ing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions .... " In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). Certain
plaintiffs also sought review of the district court's order on a petition for mandamus,
asserting an abuse of judicial discretion. Id. at 1177. The court of appeals did not
discuss the propriety of review on that basis.
192. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982) (construing the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)).
The majority opinion did not distinguish between the subsection (b)(1)(A) class,
which was certified on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages,
and the subsection (b)(1)(B) class, which was certified on the issues of liability for and
amount of punitive damages. The dissent, however, correctly stated that the subsec-
tion (b) (1) (A) class was improper because the rule was not meant to require certifica-
tion to avoid the possibility of inconsistent damages verdicts. Id. at 1187 n.8
(Heaney, J., dissenting). See supra note 177.
193. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
194. Id. at 852. The Ninth Circuit also decertified the statewide subsection (b)(3)
class for compensatory damages because it failed to meet the typicality requirement
of Rule 23(a) as well as the superiority requirement of subsection (b)(3). Id. at 854-
56. This is consistent with the trend of cases in the Ninth Circuit and throughout the
country concerning common question class actions on mass tort liability issues. See
supra note 173.
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punitive damages was jeopardized by either a lack of funds or an
implied-in-law limit on aggregate punitive damages awards. 19 5
a. The Eighth Circuit Decision
Surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit eschewed standard class action
analysis and based its decision on the Anti-Injunction Act,"" which,
with certain exceptions, prohibits federal courts from enjoining pro-
ceedings pending in state courts. 9 7 Because the mandatory class certi-
fication had been ordered by the federal district court after lawsuits
had been initiated in state court, the court of appeals reasoned that
the order effectively enjoined the state court from continuing to adju-
dicate the punitive damages claims. 98 The court rejected the argu-
ment that this situation came within the Act's exception for injunc-
tions "necessary in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction" because of
the adverse effect independently pursued punitive damages claims
might have on remaining claims. According to the majority, at this
point there was no limited fund, but only "an uncertain claim for
punitive damages against defendants who have not conceded liabil-
ity." 99 Having so easily disposed of the lower court's primary basis for
certification, the court of appeals held that the situation merely in-
volved simultaneous in personam actions in state and federal courts
regarding the same subject matter, a practice permitted under the
dual federal-state system.2 0
0
This rigid construction of the Anti-Injunction Act creates a poten-
tial barrier to class certification in mass tort cases. The Eighth Circuit,
195. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The Act provides that a "court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
197. Id.
198. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
199. Id. at 1182. In a strong dissent, Judge Heaney wrote that because the
inevitable effect of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification order is to preclude independent
litigation in all other courts, it "seems self-evident that an injunction to protect the
ordinary scope of a mandatory class action is 'necessary in aid of' the federal jurisdic-
tion over such a class." Id. at 1191-92 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1182-83. The court cited Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S.
623 (1977), and Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922), as support. Neither
Vendo nor Kline, however, involved a class action, let alone a mandatory action
grounded on the need to protect claimants to a limited fund.
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by holding the Anti-Injunction Act paramount, may effectively pre-
vent certification of a Rule 23 mandatory class action whenever even a
single case involving the same subject matter has been initiated previ-
ously in state court.2 01
b. The Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Rule 23(a) criteria was essen-
tially a prelude to its more definitive holding under Rule 23(b) (1) (B).
Although the court held that the class action failed to satisfy the Rule
23(a) prerequisites of commonality,20 2 typicality20 3 and adequacy of
representation, 20 4 the basis of this holding appeared to be the court's
201. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1193 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
202. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 850, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). The court of appeals determined
that the factual and legal issues in the punitive damages claims were "not entirely
common" to all plaintiffs. Id. With respect to various plaintiffs who began using the
product at different times, the court was concerned that the culpability of Robins
might vary depending on the information it had concerning side effects, its conceal-
ment of that information, and its advertising and promotion. Id. One who suffered
injuries in 1974 might have an altogether different punitive damage case than one
who was injured in 1970. The court also suggested that the legal standards to be
applied in determining whether and to what extent punitive damages should be
awarded might well differ among individual plaintiffs. 693 F.2d at 850. See supra
note 190. The court's analysis of this issue, however, was inappropriate. The fact that
some issues are not common does not mean that the commonality requirement is not
met. See Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1334 (8th Cir. 1974). The
inquiry under Rule 23(a) is whether there are questions of law and fact common to
the class, not whether such questions predominate. Predomination is only required in
connection with a Rule 23(b)(3) common question class action. The court essentially
conceded this point by stating: "If commonality were the only problem in this case, it
might be possible to sustain some kind of a punitive damage class." In re Northern
Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
203. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). The court noted in
cursory fashion that no plaintiffs sought or accepted the role of representative parties
and stated: "Typicality, while it may not be insurmountable, remains a significant
problem." Id.
204. Id. at 851. Opposition to the punitive damages class action was so vehement
that some plaintiffs' attorneys threatened legal action against the firm appointed as
lead counsel. Not only did that firm subsequently resign as lead counsel for the
punitive damages class, but no other plaintiffs' attorneys expressed a willingness to
serve as lead counsel. Interview with Rodney Klein, original lead counsel for punitive
damages class, in Sacramento, California (June 14, 1982). Although the district court
eventually appointed an attorney not previously connected with the Dalkon Shield
litigation, who accepted the lead counsel position, the court of appeals was obviously
troubled by the plaintiffs' hostility to a class action. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
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concern with the problem of managing a class action involving multi-
state claims of persons vehemently opposed to their forced member-
ship in a class. 25 These management problems, however, are more
appropriately analyzed in terms of the superiority of the class action to
individual litigation. 20 6
The more significant aspect of the Ninth Circuit's decision was its
conclusion that the circumstances relied upon by the lower court did
not constitute the kind of limited fund envisioned under Rule
23(b) (1) (B) .207 The court of appeals rejected both grounds for the
lower court's finding of a limited fund-the inability of defendants to
satisfy potential judgments and the implied-in-law ceiling on punitive
damages recoveries-because the record did not establish that sepa-
rate punitive damages awards would "inescapably" or "necessarily"
affect later claims. 208 According to the court, the theoretical possibil-
ity that later plaintiffs' recoveries would be diminished or eliminated
by earlier recoveries did not satisfy the requirements of Rule
23(b) (1) (B) .209 The court noted, however, that "[t]he detrimental ef-
fect of earlier claims upon later claims commends itself. . . as worthy
of future judicial and legislative consideration. '210
3. A Critical Analysis: Appellate Overkill
The problem with the appellate opinions in the Skywalk and
Dalkon Shield cases is not that they were wrongly decided, but rather
205. See 693 F.2d at 850-51. The court stated: "We are not necessarily ruling out
the class action tool as a means for expediting multi-party product liability actions in
appropriate cases, but the combined difficulties overlapping from each of the ele-
ments of Rule 23(a) preclude certification in this case." Id. at 851.
206. See infra pt. III(C)(2)(c).
207. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
208. Id. at 851-52. While the likelihood of insufficient funds to pay all claims is a
recognized ground for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification, see Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77
F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note to 1966
amendment, the factual basis for such a finding was challenged by the plaintiffs. See
Opening Brief for Appellant at 9-10, In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
The Ninth Circuit was critical of the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to
conduct limited discovery on the issue of Robins' ability to pay all claims in the
litigation: "Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is proper only when separate punitive
damages claims necessarily will affect later claims. The district court erred by
ordering certification without sufficient evidence of, or even a preliminary fact-
finding inquiry concerning Robins' actual assets, insurance, settlement experience
and continuing exposure." In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
209. 693 F.2d at 851-52.
210. Id. at 851.
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that they went too far. In each case, the assertion of a limited fund
was rejected as speculative.2 1 1 Although both courts limited their
holdings to the cases' factual circumstances, the likelihood in future
cases that a similar assertion will be speculative renders these decisions
broadly applicable. Therefore, punitive damages class actions may be
precluded even when class actions provide the best means of adjudi-
cating the claims.
This unsatisfactory result is due in part to the structure of Rule 23
itself, which by its terms does not permit a trial court or a court of
review to consider whether a mandatory class action is the best means
of adjudication in the particular circumstances. Only in Rule 23(b)(3)
common question class actions are courts permitted to consider the
relative superiority of the class action device to individual litigation. 212
The inquiry under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) is essentially confined to whether
individual adjudications would somehow prejudice the rights of other
members of the prospective class.2 13 The district courts in the Skywalk
and Dalkon Shield cases correctly held that some class members would
be prejudiced,2 14 because it was clear that funds for payment of
punitive damages would become more limited with each ensuing
award, if for no other reason than the implicit limits on permissible
aggregate punitive damages recoveries. The Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits, however, would require more concrete evidence before recog-
nizing such a limited fund.
The chilling effect of the Skywalk and Dalkon Shield appellate
decisions could be avoided by introducing qualitative criteria into the
certification process in cases involving multiple punitive damages
claims. Unlike the traditional Rule 23(b)(1)(B) situations, which al-
ways require classwide adjudication, multiple punitive damages
claims should result in certification of a class action only when the
benefits of the device outweigh the problems it would cause. Recogni-
tion of these claims as a hybrid of subsections (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3)
would provide a way to distinguish those mass tort cases in which the
punitive damages claims should be adjudicated in a single classwide
proceeding from those not appropriate for class treatment.2 15 Beyond
211. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
212. See supra note 149.
213. Id.
214. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated,
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal.
1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
215. If the limited fund concept of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) were extended to cover class
actions for punitive damages in products liability cases, a trial court considering
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the usual inquiry into the general class action prerequisites, courts
faced with the question of certifying a punitive damages class action
should be permitted to decide whether it is the best way under the
circumstances to adjudicate the punitive damages claims.
The use of this qualitative analysis in the Skywalk and Dalkon
Shield cases would have led to either the denial of certification by the
district courts or the decertification of such actions by the courts of
appeals without establishing barriers to future class actions. The uni-
lateral usurpation of authority by each district court over the many
cases pending outside its jurisdiction was unwarranted. In the Sky-
walk cases, most of the lawsuits were filed in the state court, which
had administered the litigation, coordinated discovery and encour-
aged settlements.21 6 The brisk pace at which cases were being settled
prior to the certification order was halted by the certification of the
punitive damages class action.2 17 The anomalous result was that a
class action aimed at expediting resolution of punitive damages claims
actually delayed recovery of compensation for injuries. Compensation
of the victims of a disaster should not be secondary to punitive dam-
ages claims.218 A qualitative assessment of the foreseeable impact on
the settlement process would certainly have led to denial of certifica-
tion.
In the Dalkon Shield cases, the order certifying a nationwide puni-
tive damages class amounted to a unilateral assumption of authority
over thousands of cases pending in other jurisdictions. The fact that
the court ordering certification had previously dismissed the punitive
damages claims in a Dalkon Shield trial, 2 1 and that the defendant
strongly supported the class action while all plaintiffs opposed it, gave
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) could properly imply a superiority requirement
or otherwise consider superiority in addition to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites. In
practice, reviewing courts have found an abuse of discretion only when the trial
court incorrectly applied the specific criteria of Rule 23. See, e.g., Walker v. Jim
Dandy Co., 638 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (numerosity and commonality);
Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 1977) (inadequate
representation), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463 (1978); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1332-
33 (9th Cir. 1977) (numerosity); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1380-
81 (5th Cir. 1974) (numerosity and superiority).
216. See supra note 187.
217. Id.
218. See Brief of Appellant Jaqueline N. Rau at 43-44, In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
219. Opening Brief of Appellant at 7, In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Breyer v. A.H. Robins
Co., No. 75-1459 (N.D. Cal. 1980), which ruled as a matter of law that there was
insufficient evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
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the impression of unfairness to the plaintiff class. 220 The prospect of a
nationwide class of unwilling plaintiffs bound by the result obtained
by an attorney whom they did not trust provided a compelling reason
for decertification.
IV. RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR ADJUDICATING MASS
TORT PUNITIvE DAMAGES CLAIMS
A. Class Actions
Courts should have the discretion to adjudicate all mass tort puni-
tive damages claims in a single, classwide proceeding when a class
action is superior to individual litigation. If class action treatment is
otherwise appropriate in connection with these claims, certification
should be granted under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which precludes individual
claimants from opting out.22 1 This approach permits distribution of
punitive damages far more equitably than the present system, which
rewards plaintiffs on a first-come, first-served basis. All mass tort
cases with multiple claims for punitive damages present a potential
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) limited fund situation; early awards may affect later
claims because of either the defendant's inability to pay or the im-
plied-in-law limit on total awards.
Courts considering certification of punitive damages claims should
initially focus on whether the Rule 23(a) general class action prerequi-
sites are satisfied and, if they are, whether a mandatory class action is
superior to individual adjudication under the circumstances. Because
220. These circumstances provided the basis for plaintiffs' argument that Robins
had "forum shopped" for an anti-punitive damages court in which to dispose of all
the punitive damages claims. Id. at 8.
221. Another approach that might achieve the same result was recommended in
Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should
They Survive?, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 1 (1981). The authors suggest that when a common
question class action includes claims for punitive damages, those who opt out of the
class should be precluded from recovering punitive damages. Id. at 27. Although the
authors do not specifically address the problem of mass tort personal injury litigation,
this approach could be used in those mass torts which are certifiable under Rule
23(b)(3). One problem, however, is that relatively few mass injury cases have been
held to qualify for certification under the common question subsection. See supra
note 173. Other problems are the statutory notice and opt out provisions of subsec-
tion (c)(2) which are specifically applicable to all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Punitive
damages class actions pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B), however, do not depend on the
maintenance of a class action on the liability issues in the underlying personal injury
cases. Therefore, the issue of punitive damages liability could be adjudicated in a
single proceeding even if the other issues in the litigation are not appropriate for class
action treatment. Moreover, the provisions prohibiting opting out of a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class action are already in place. There is no need to revise statutory
requirements in order to adjudicate all the claims in a single proceeding.
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the Rule 23(a) prerequisites will be met in most mass tort situations,2
the primary focus usually will be on the question of superiority.22 3
Courts should then focus on qualitative criteria in connection with
the certification of punitive damages class actions under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), including (1) the pendency of punitive damages claims in
other jurisdictions, (2) the foreseeable effect of a class action on the
settlement process, and (3) the degree to which the prospective class
members support or oppose the class action. These factors differ some-
what from the factors enumerated in Rule 23(b)(3) for common ques-
tion class actions. 224
1. Pendency of Punitive Damages Claims in Other Jurisdictions
Mass tort litigation often takes place in more than one jurisdiction.
Lawsuits based upon a defect in a mass-produced product, for exam-
ple, are likely to be filed in each state where the injuries occur. A
single disaster, such as the crash of a commercial airliner, will often
spawn multistate and multidistrict litigation.225 Certification by one
court of a mandatory punitive damages class action will necessarily
affect cases in other jurisdictions. While some intrusion upon the
authority of other states and courts226 is tolerable in the interests of
justice and economy, there are limits that a court should not unilater-
ally exceed.
222. Probably the most troublesome of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites in mass tort
cases is "typicality." Plaintiffs will sometimes have claims against defendants not
named by other plaintiffs. In the analogous case of LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan
Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973), involving actions based on violations of the Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1976), the Ninth Circuit held that a class
representative who was not injured by some of the defendants could not sue on behalf
of persons with claims against those defendants, even though the representative had
suffered identical injuries at the hands of other parties. Id. at 466.
223. See supra note 215.
224. See supra note 149.
225. See S. Speiser, Lawsuit 450-51 (1980); Speiser, Resolving Foreign Air Crashes
in the American Court System, Nat'l L.J., Oct 11, 1982, at 24, col. 1.
226. Choice of law problems should not generally prevent certification if sensible
procedures are utilized. A federal court in a diversity case must apply the choice of
law rule of the forum. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
Strussberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1978). There
are several different approaches to tort choice of law, and few judicial opinions that
provide clear guidelines. Some states still follow the traditional rule, which applies
the law of the place of injury. E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 17.7, at 560-61
(1982). Many jurisdictions, however, prefer more analytical choice of law methods,
such as "interest analysis," see id. §§ 17.11 to .17, the "better law" approach, see id.
§§ 17.18 to .20, or the "most-significant-relationship test," see id. §§ 17.21 to .25;
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). These approaches require
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A court considering certification in these circumstances should first
investigate the factual and evidentiary bases for the punitive damages
claims to determine whether they would likely be submitted to a jury.
If it appears probable that the court would eventually dismiss the
punitive damages claims upon a motion for summary judgment or a
directed verdict, the court should deny class certification without
further inquiry. The decision on the merits of the claims would thus
remain with the other courts in which the claims are pending. Other-
wise, a mandatory certification order might effectively wrest jurisdic-
tion of the punitive claims from other courts only to result eventually
in their dismissal on the merits. This was a legitimate concern in the
Dalkon Shield litigation because of the district court's dismissal of the
punitive damage claims in an earlier trial. 2 7
When a federal district court, however, concludes that the multi-
state punitive damages claims would probably reach the jury and that
a class action is the best way to adjudicate them, 22 8 it should refer the
essentially that the forum court determine initially whether there is a true conflict
between the substantive rules of two or more of the interested states, and, if there is
such a conflict, to apply the rule of the state whose policy would be more adversely
affected by the application of the other state's rule. See Bradley, After Hurtado and
Bernhard: Interest Analysis and the Search for a Consistent Theory for Choice of
Law Cases, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 150 (1976).
When the conflict questions are merely procedural or involve only the standard of
culpability for punitive damages liability, there either is no true conflict or the forum
state has as much governmental interest in the application of its standard as does any
other state. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 916-17 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). In the Dalkon Shield case, defendant A.H.
Robins went out of its way to avoid a true conflict situation by indicating that it
might stipulate to the most'" 'liberal' standard of punitive damages." Id. at 917. The
situation is different if the law of another state with a significant interest does not
permit punitive damages. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d
594, 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981) (state in which disaster
occurred had the most "legitimate interest" in litigation; law barring punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death actions prevailed); Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454
F. Supp. 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying Dutch law barring punitive damages to
claims of Massachusetts residents killed in air crash in Canary Islands).
227. See supra note 219. The Supreme Court has precluded inquiry into the merits
of a class action by a district court seeking to shift the cost of notice to the defendant.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974). "[T]he plaintiff must pay
for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit." Id. at
179. This should not bar a preliminary assessment of the potential success of a class
action by a district court seeking to avoid unnecessary intrusions on the jurisdiction of
state courts. Cf. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941) (The
anti-injunction statute "expresses the desire of Congress to avoid friction between the
federal government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal authority
into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process.").
228. Punitive damages claims arising out of product-related injuries will some-
times involve such divergent factual issues that trying them all in one proceeding
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case to the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation. The Judicial
Panel is not empowered to decide the issue of class certification, but it
can select an appropriate forum in which to consolidate all related
actions pending in federal district courts.22 9 This would provide an
opportunity for all parties in those actions to support or oppose certifi-
cation in a single proceeding. Ultimately, the court selected by the
Judicial Panel would decide whether to certify the class. 230 This proce-
dure would avoid the kind of forum-shopping, or at least the appear-
ance of it, which became an issue in the Dalkon Shield case. 23' Even
more important, reference to the Judicial Panel would prevent un-
warranted unilateral intrusions by one court on other courts that are
actively conducting the litigation. 232
2. Effect on the Settlement Process
The primary goal in adjudicating mass tort cases should be to
compensate deserving plaintiffs for their injuries as fairly and effi-
ciently as possible. This is often achieved by settlements before trial.
would be unduly chaotic, even with the utilization of subclasses permitted by Rule
23(c)(4).
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) ("Such transfers shall be made by the judicial
panel ... upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions." (emphasis added)).
230. See In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litig., 424 F. Supp.
504, 507 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 494-95
(J.P.M.D.L. 1968). The transferee court would have the power to vacate or modify a
class action determination made previously by any of the transferor courts. Cf. In re
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. at 489 ("The pretrial powers of the transferee
court include the powers to modify, expand, or vacate earlier discovery orders.").
231. See supra note 220. All parties must be notified of hearings on the issue of
transfer and allowed to offer evidence on that issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1976).
Furthermore, the Judicial Panel, not the parties, decides which court controls the
class action proceedings. Id. § 1407(a). Therefore, no party will be able to choose a
forum court because they believe the court may be predisposed to decide in their
favor. The Judicial Panel, however, has authority to consolidate only cases pending
in federal district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). The problem of forum-
shopping may still exist when a class is certified by a state court.
232. Certification by a federal district court, if viewed as enjoining actions initi-
ated by class members in other courts, may present difficulties under the federal anti-
injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). See supra pt. III(B)(2)(a). The use of the
recommended three-step procedure (transferor court-Judicial Panel-transferee
court) should minimize the potential for unwarranted intrusions and help to ensure
that certification will only be granted when it is "necessary in aid of [the district
court's] jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). By contrast, certification by a state
court would not be considered an intrusion on the jurisdiction of other courts. See
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 121 (1890).
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Even when all other factors point toward a class action, certification
should be denied when the court finds after a hearing that it would
significantly impede or delay the resolution of the underlying dis-
putes. 23 3 In those circumstances the benefits of resolving the punitive
damages claims in one proceeding are outweighed by the adverse
effect on the timely resolution of other proceedings concerned with
compensatory claims for injuries or deaths.2 34
In any event, the impact of a mandatory class certification order on
the settlement process and on punitive damages claims pending in
other jurisdictions warrants adoption of a speedy interlocutory appel-
late procedure. Under current practice, such an order is reviewable on
an interlocutory basis only when the district court specifically desig-
nates it for immediate appeal,2 35 when the order is construed as an
injunction of pending cases, 236 or upon a petition for a writ of manda-
mus alleging an abuse of judicial discretion.237 The certification order
should always be construed as an injunction of pending cases, ensur-
ing the availability of interlocutory review. 23.
233. To some extent, a temporary delay in settlements will be a natural byproduct
of any certification of a mandatory class action for punitive damages arising out of a
mass tort, particularly during the uncertain period while the order is appealed. Once
the class action is approved on appeal, however, it should be settled or tried quickly.
Settlements of compensatory damages claims should continue because the defendants
will not have to fear the return of individual claimants for recovery of punitive
damages.
234. A Rule 23(b)(3) class action may actually encourage settlements. Following
the reversal of the original class certification in the Skywalk cases, class actions were
certified by both the federal district and state courts. Lauter, Hyatt Litigation Could
Set Pattern for Disaster Cases, Nat'l L.J., Jan 24, 1983, at 3, col. 2, 26, col. 2.
Settlement negotiations then resumed in full force and left only a few cases to be
resolved by trial. Id. at 26, col. 3. The state court settlement package included a $20
million fund for "supplementary" payments, which have been viewed as "a form of a
sub rosa punitive damages payment." Id. The federal court settlement package
included a $3.5 million fund for attorneys' fees and similar "supplementary" pay-
ments, as well as a $6.5 million payment to a group of charities as a "healing
gesture." Id.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The court of appeals may, in its discretion,
entertain an interlocutory appeal "[w]hen a district judge. . . shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. This was the
procedure employed in the Dalkon Shield class certification appeal. In re Northern
Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983).
936. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
237. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). In the Skywalk appeal, the Eighth Circuit
assumed jurisdiction on the basis that the certification order effectively enjoined
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3. Degree of Support for or Opposition to the Class
While not controlling, the degree to which members of the class
support or oppose class certification is a relevant consideration in the
certification decision. Overwhelming opposition by the potential
class, such as in the Dalkon Shield and Skywalk cases,239 can result in a
series of disputes as well as an appearance of unfairness or bias.2 40 A
procedural device aimed at streamlining litigation should not be used
if it causes even more chaos. If all other factors, however, indicate
that a class action is the best way to adjudicate the punitive damages
claims, the opposition of the litigants should not be dispositive. This is
particularly true when the opposition is based on the loss of fees that
plaintiffs' attorneys hoped to recover by individual pursuit of the
punitive damages claims. Courts considering certification should ana-
lyze the nature of the opposition after a full hearing. If the class action
is well-founded and opponents understand the court's reasons for
certification, continuing opposition can be reduced, especially when
an immediate appeal is permitted and the class certification is upheld.
B. Bifurcated Trials and Increased Judicial Control
Although class actions provide the best way to adjudicate mass tort
punitive damages claims in some circumstances, there are many in-
claims for punitive damages which were already pending in state court. In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
See supra note 191. These grounds for interlocutory appeal should be expanded in
mandatory mass tort class actions so that certification orders can be reviewed on an
interlocutory basis even if there are no pending claims in state courts. The fact that
the claims could be made in state court or other federal district courts should be
enough because the mandatory certification would preclude the litigation of these
claims in all courts except the one which certified the class.
239. See supra note 204.
240. Id. In the Skywalk case, the appointment of Irving Younger as one of the lead
counsel was particularly grating to other plaintiffs' attorneys because the client he
represented, unlike other plaintiffs, did not have significant injuries. Brief of Appel-
lant Jacqueline N. Rau at 37, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). The resentment of plaintiffs' attorneys was
compounded when the court permitted Younger to remain as lead counsel, see id. at
22-25, even when it became apparent that Younger's client could not qualify as class
representative because she lacked diversity from all defendants. 680 F.2d at 1178-79.
The district court's conduct resulted in a motion for disqualification based on demon-
strated partiality and bias. Although the court's denial of the motion for disqualifica-
tion was upheld on appeal, the court of appeals indicated that it did not condone the
lower court's ex parte communications in search of a class representative. Id. at 1184.
Attorneys representing clients with substantial compensatory damages claims may
have had reason to doubt the adequacy of representation, given lead counsel's
predominant concern with the punitive damages issue. See supra note 187. Lead
counsel should scrupulously avoid giving even the appearance of placing the interest
of his own client or his fees above the best interests of the class members.
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stances in which the device is not superior to individual adjudication.
Furthermore, consideration of the factors discussed earlier may reveal
that one or more of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are not met. In these
circumstances, courts must be able to administer the individual claims
so that appropriate punitive damages are assessed but overkill is
avoided.
The proposals for accomplishing this that have received the most
support include fixing limits on awards for a single wrong and remov-
ing the assessment function from the jury.241 Despite support for these
measures, arbitrary limits on aggregate awards based on dollar
amounts and percentages of net worth should be rejected as needlessly
inflexible and potentially overprotective of large corporations. 242
Moreover, removal of the jury's assessment function to prevent puni-
tive damages overkill unnecessarily eliminates the jury's important
role as the conscience of the community. 243
The problems presented by multiple punitive damages claims in
mass tort actions can be resolved by applying procedures already
available without changing the jury's functions. Through early dis-
missal of unsupported claims, bifurcation of trials and close scrutiny
of amounts awarded, courts can ensure the fair and effective punish-
ment of outrageous conduct which results in mass injuries.
1. Dismissal of Unsupported Claims
As soon as possible after discovery has been completed, courts
should rule on whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case for punitive damages.2 44 If the claim survives a motion for
summary judgment, the court should carefully assess the evidence
presented at trial. If the evidence is insufficient to justify a punitive
award, the court should direct a verdict on the issue.245 This will
ensure that only serious punitive damages claims will be considered by
juries.
2. Bifurcation of Trials
Under procedures already available in federal courts2 46 and in most
states, 2 47 the trial judge may order separate trials of claims or issues
241. See supra pt. II.
242. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
244. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 57.
245. See Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(affirming directed verdict on issue of punitive damages); Turney v. Ford Motor Co.,
94 Ill. App. 3d 678, 686, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1085 (1981) (affirming trial court's
decision to strike punitive damages claim at conclusion of plaintiff's case).
246. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides, in relevant part: "The court, in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
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when necessary to avoid confusion, prejudice or delay. A bifurcated
trial procedure in cases involving punitive damages claims would
permit a jury to receive all relevant evidence bearing on the amount of
punishment without prejudicing the defendant on other issues in dis-
pute.2 48 In the first trial, the parties would present evidence relating to
liability for compensatory and punitive damages, and the amount of
compensatory damages.2 49 The jury would be reconvened for a second
trial only if it found the defendant liable for both compensatory and
punitive damages. The second proceeding would be limited to evi-
dence bearing on the proper amount of punitive damages, including
other claims and awards arising out of the same mass tort and the
financial condition of the defendant. The trial judge and appellate
courts would continue to review these awards.
Although in certain situations this procedure would be more time
consuming than a single trial, in other circumstances it would actually
save time. For example, a second trial would be necessary only if (1)
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . . . or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims. . . always preserving inviolate the right of
trial by jury. ... Although no court has considered the type of bifurcation recom-
mended in this Article, a more disruptive and time-consuming type of bifurcation has
been employed. See Holben v. Midwest Emery Freight Sys., 525 F. Supp. 1224
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (separate trials ordered for underlying personal injury claims and
punitive damages claims for negligent entrustment of truck to employee). But see
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924
(1961) (reversal of trial court's decision to bifurcate issue of punitive damages in
personal injury suit arising out of plane crash because of overlapping proof of
underlying liability and punitive damages claims). Bifurcation of the punitive dam-
ages issue in mass tort litigation, however, is well within the discretion of trial courts
pursuant to Rule 42(b) because it involves no duplication of evidence and no time-
consuming impanelling of a second jury. See infra text accompanying note 249.
247. J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra note 38, § 12.05, at 15 & n.1 (listing state
statutes "identical or substantially similar to Federal Rule 42(b)"). Some states only
allow bifurcation of separate claims, not separate issues. Id. at 15 & n.2. Punitive
damages in these jurisdictions, however, may be considered "separate but depen-
dent" claims and, therefore, subject to bifurcation. Id. § 12.07, at 20. Only four
states have no statutes dealing with bifurcation. Id. § 12.05, at 15, 16 n.3 (Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Carolina). Bifurcation in these jurisdictions
depends on a trial judge's inherent power, a question on which the authorities are
split. Id. § 12.08.
248. Cf. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 272, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (1975) (a
defendant's wealth should not be discoverable until after a jury has found the
defendant liable for compensatory and punitive damages in the first proceeding).
The Rupert approach seems overly protective of a defendant's right to privacy. A
better view would permit such discovery before trial upon some showing of support
for the claim. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3295 (West Supp. 1983); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher,
supra note 38, § 12.10, at 26-31.
249. This is a simpler and more time-saving procedure than that suggested by one
commentator, who would require a separate trial on all punitive damages issues. See
Fulton, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 15 Forum 117, 129-30 (1979).
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the trial judge found that sufficient evidence had been presented to
submit the punitive damages issue to the jury, (2) the jury found the
defendant liable for compensatory damages and (3) the jury deter-
mined that punitive damages should be awarded. Moreover, in view
of the historically large number of mass tort cases settled before
trial, 250 the additional burden imposed by the bifurcation procedure
on the judicial system would actually be quite small.
3. Close Scrutiny of Punitive Awards
Despite the existing procedural safeguards, a jury might occasion-
ally return an exorbitant or vindictive punitive damages verdict in a
mass tort case. Continuing the trend of active review of punitive
awards, 51 trial and appellate courts can and should reduce or vacate
such excessive penalties. Trial courts should be granted discretion to
determine whether previous awards based on the same tortious con-
duct have reached a level at which any additional punishment is
excessive.
CONCLUSION
The wave of mass sort litigation in the 1980's has again raised the
spectre of repeated and excessive punitive damages awards for a single
course of tortious conduct. Unless methods are found to adjudicate
these claims fairly, efficiently and with proper controls, the doctrine
of punitive damages stands to be weakened considerably by "reform"
legislation. Proposals currently being considered would establish arbi-
trary limits on total awards and remove from the jury its traditional
function of assessing the amount of punishment. These changes, how-
ever, would decrease the deterrent effect of punitive damages and
might render civil punishment ineffectual.
The procedures recommended in this Article offer practical alterna-
tives to current proposals for reform and are available under existing
procedural rules. One procedure, attempted unsuccessfully in the
Skywalk and Dalkon Shield cases, combines all punitive damages
awards arising out of the same tortious conduct into a single class
action. Unlike other procedural devices, a mandatory class action can
both control the amount of punishment and provide for distribution of
250. See supra notes 7, 89 and accompanying text.
251. E.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., 536 F.2d 645, 651 (6th Cir. 1976) (reversing
punitive damages award); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48-49 (Alaska
1979) (reducing amount of punitive damages award), modified on other grounds,
615 P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352
So. 2d 1221, 1225, 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (reversing punitive damages
award); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1113-17, 427 N.E.2d
608, 616-19 (1981) (same); see Owen II, supra note 32, at 1321.
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the amount awarded among the insured plaintiffs on an equitable
basis. While the limited fund provisions of Rule 23 provide a vehicle
for such class actions, certification should not be granted automati-
cally. The benefits of classwide adjudication of punitive damages
claims may be outweighed, as they were in the Skywalk and Dalkon
Shield cases, by the detrimental impact that certification would have
on the overall management of the litigation, including settlements of
the underlying personal injury claims.
When class actions are inappropriate, the problem of punitive dam-
ages overkill can still be avoided through other procedural devices
available in the federal and most state courts. Early dismissal of
unsupported claims will save time and ensure that a jury considers
punitive damages only when there is sufficient evidence of blatant
misconduct. Bifurcation of trials will permit a jury to hear evidence
bearing solely on the amount of punishment only after it first finds
against a defendant on liability for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. This procedure will eliminate the danger that such evidence
might prejudice the jury with respect to other issues in the trial.
Finally, close scrutiny by trial judges and appellate courts of punitive
damages awards can prevent excessive punishment by a single jury or,
in the aggregate, by several juries.
Existing rules of civil procedure are flexible enough to accommo-
date punitive damages claims in mass tort cases. Under these rules,
juries can still express society's outrage at egregious conduct without
being permitted to destroy an otherwise worthy business entity for a
single disastrous mistake.
